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The airline Industry has been recognised as a high value industry. The market carrying 
over 2 billion passengers each year and occupied over 35% of global merchandise in 
trade by value1• Studies have been conducted globally to investigate the feasibility and 
return on investment for local or international airlines, with several analytical 
methodologies in use. The focus of this dissertation is to analyse the impact of financial 
risk factors, including interest rate exposures, currency fluctuations, and fuel price 
changes on the airline industry. This study investigates risk exposures in the South 
African airline industry and uses data on South African Airways (SAA) and Comair to 
calculate the impact of risk factors on exposure significance. 
The key results show that, on average, the exposures are more significant over the 
short-term horizons which becomes fundamental as the horizon length increases. In 
cases where the non-linear coefficient is slightly strengthened as the return horizon is 
lengthened, the sign of the exposure point coefficient does not necessarily point in the 
favourable direction of returns. Thus, a positive coefficient indicates a tendency of the 
risk factor and returns to move in the same direction, while a negative sign means that 
the impact on returns decreases as the exposure increases. 
Based on the financial ratio analysis of the airline characteristics, the results indicate 
that SAA shows a better return on investment better than Comair. Particularly SAA 
(SAA Annual Report: 2005) shows an improvement in performance with an increase in 
1 Source: lATA (2006) research indicates that the airline industry carries over 2 billion passengers and 
35% of global merchandise in trade by value. 
2 
revenues and stable cost bases, despites the unexpected increase in oil dollar prices by 
42%, which contrib tes to a large increase in returns. 
Lastly, structural changes in exposures are investigated, focusing on an extraordinary 
event of the global aviation industry the terrorist attack in New York on September 11 , 
2001. No impact on SAA or Comair was found during the study period, which indicates 
that our study subjects may be less risk impacted by U.S. influences in comparison to 
other international airlines. 
The common financial speculation of higher risks are accompanied by higher returns 
may not be feasible to the airline industry, but strategic planning changes and future 
financial management adaptations to fit the global economy may bring a positive 
impact on the industry. This brings opportunities for further research. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In comparison with non-international operating companies, the ones in an international 
business environment may face complex and multi-dimensional risk factors, resulting 
in either greater losses or profits for the organisation. In the aviation industry, airlines 
encounter extensive risks including strategic, financial , and operational risks, as well as 
unusual events. Strategic risks may lead the company in an erroneous direction as the 
result of inappropriate decision-making. Operational risks create potential losses from 
the transformation of revenue and resources, particularly the shift of the operational 
expenditures. Financial risks may produce uncertainty regarding future cash flows due 
to changes in global and domestic economic conditions and due to specific changes in 
operations and financing costs (Loudon, 2004). 
In addition to the normal management risks, airline companies also have to deal with 
the extraordinary turbulence in their operational environment which may result in a 
negative impact on the financial statements. Global airline companies covering 
international routes may have more experience than domestic airlines in regards to the 
intense external pressures resulting from events such as the terrorist attacks on 
September 11 , 2001 ; the Bali bombing; the declaration of the war in Iraq; and the 
outbreak of the SARS virus. However, the most important effect on operating results in 
recent times has been the deregulation of the industry combined with the effects of 
significantly higher fuel prices, which forms an important part of an airline's operating 
costs (Smyth and Pearce, 2006). Certain airlines have introduced fuel levies due to 
higher fuel prices. Further, the privatisation of airports has resulted in higher costs. In 
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addition, some airline companies have experienced major strikes by employees, 
resulting in significant daily operational losses. An external operational impact that 
airlines need to deal with is actual and potential competition from new entrants to the 
industry, which has resulted in lower prices and profits but not necessarily an increase 
in volumes. All of these factors indicate the potential for large losses if airline 
companies are incapable of managing these risks promptly, and the results of these risk 
factors reflect explicitly and significantly on the annual financial statements of the 
airline companies. 
This study examines the critical financial exposures of the airline industry and the 
impact of these exposures on the two major airlines in South Africa. There are three 
specific financial risk factors that airline companies normally emphasise in relation to 
daily operations: interest rates, foreign exchange rates and fuel prices, which maybe 
hedged with an appropriate instrument. For example, Qantas Airways in Australia 
stated that their financial performance is subject to interest rate, foreign currency, fuel 
price and credit risks2 (Note 32, Qantas Annual Financial Report, 2003). Another note 
in the financial report mentioned that Qantas "manages these risk exposures using 
various financial instruments". Similar evidence is contained in the annual reports for 
Air New Zealand and South African Airways3. The common hedging instruments which 
international companies often use include interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements, 
and options to manage interest rate risk; cross-currency swaps, forward foreign 
exchange contracts, and currency options to manage currency risks; and options and 
2 Credit risk exposure is not analysed in this paper. 
3 Similar statements are found in the annual report for Air New Zealand and South African Airways. 
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swaps4 on aviation fuel and jet kerosene to manage fuel price risks. Thus, it is crucial 
for directors to manage these key financial risk factors and to integrate them with other 
risk management in truments, as part of the core corporate finance function of the 
company. 
The aim of this dissertation is to conduct a study of the financial exposures to these 
three major financial factors confronting South African Airways (SAA), the dominant 
airline company in South Africa; and Comair, a Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
listed airline company. The methodology use in the current study follows the research 
study model published by Loudon (2004) on Qantas and Air New Zealand in Australia 
and New Zealand, respectively. By using the same method of analysis, this study 
investigates the impact of interest rate changes, currency fluctuations, and fuel price 
exposures on SAA, which is the leading international and domestic airline company in 
Africa; and Comair, which is currently operating under the brand names of British 
Airways and Kulula.com in both domestic and international routes. 
This study also considers the volatility and variety of trends in interest rates, currency 
values, and fuel prices throughout the period under analysis. These include exposure to 
the foreign currency exchange rate fluctuations (especially with the Rand falling to a 
level of ZAR 14 to USD 1 and appreciating to ZAR 5 to USD 1 from 2001 to 2004) and 
the consistent increase in fuel prices (data reflected in 1997 of USD 9.40 per barrel 
increased to USD 67.40 in 2005). The abovementioned financial events have caused 
4 Swap contract, as an exchange of streams of payments over time according to pre determined terms 
and conditions, allows Airline to pay or receive the difference between the agreed fixed price and the 
floating market price calculated on the notional amounts of such contracts. 
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airlines to experience financial losses in recent financial years, as those factors cannot 
be controlled by management. 
Several studies (Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2002 and DiIorio and Faff, 2001 , and 
Bartram, 2002) have included tests for the existence of a single extra-market risk5, and 
most of these studies are based on exchange rate analysis or interest rate exposures, as 
these factors have been largely used for financial corporations. Most of these papers 
focused on the aggr gate performance of the industries or a wide spectrum of the 
individual companies, without controlling for industry effects. In order to integrate the 
effects of these exposures, this study in contrast, investigates interest rate, currency, and 
fuel price exposures simultaneously. This is because analysing the foremost companies 
within a single indu try in a specific context may provide a better and more practical 
incremental knowledge ofthe impact of the financial risk exposures on the companies. 
The instability of foreign exchange rates and interest rates as a result of the South 
African Reserve Bank's policies, as well as the increase in the fuel prices caused the 
airlines under study to operate with increased financial difficulties. This is important in 
the analysis ofthe continued existence and relevance of financial risk exposures. 
Before the commencement of the study, it is inevitable to notice that SAA has a 
vulnerable financial structure, which causes its financial system to be sensitive to the 
major economic factors. SAA experienced a series of financial losses during the period 
under review and one of the reasons for its continued existence is due to the reluctant 
5 Analysis of financial impacts based on a single risk factor. 
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financial support offered by the government via the Transnet group6. Under such 
conditions, it may therefore be rational to predict a greater significant influence on the 
risk coefficients within SAA than Comair. 
This study focuses on the significance of returns in the presence of the three major 
financial exposures in relation to the short- and long-term horizon frames of SAA and 
Comair. The main results from this study indicate that there are significant influences 
on the financial exposures over the equity of SAA in both the short- and long-term 
horizons. The reason is that the losses on the shareholders' investments in the airline 
result in high sensitivity to the financial exposures. The significance levels of the risk 
exposures on the market value of Comair are distinctive, as the currency exposure 
shows a significant influence in the short-term but no significant influence in the 
long-term. Conversely, interest rate and fuel price levels are significant in the long-term 
period, but not in short-term horizons. A possible explanation for this is that Comair is 
better able to manage their short-term exposures. An additional finding of this study, 
and in contrast to the findings of the other airline studies, is that the extraordinary 
events of September 2001 had no substantial impact on the subject airlines' returns, nor 
on the major economic factors. This shows that South African airlines are impacted less 
significantly by the United States' aviation disastrous events. 
Later in this study, Chapter 2 summarizes the historical background of SAA and Comair, 
as well as their current financial status and forecasted strategic projections. Chapter 3 
6 The financial support provided by the government to SAA has also impacted the company's financing 
of planes. Increasingly, SAA is using "operating" leases to finance the investment in new planes. This is 
resulting in an increased level of financial leverage, although most of these leases represent off-balance 
sheet financing. 
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presents a review of current academic studies, which provides a theoretical analysis of 
financial risk exposures in the airline industry. Chapter 4 describes the data collection 
and data analysis m thodology employed, including global airline performance to 
provide a better understanding of the industry and a comparison to our study subjects. 
Chapter 5 illustrates the results of the analysis and reports on the significance of the 
effect of the exposures. Chapter 6 displays the results of this study and compares these 
results to the study by Loudon (2004). Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes the research with 
relevant managerial information and acknowledgements. 
14 
Chapter 2. Histories of the airlines 
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Chapter 2. Histories of the airlines 
As uncontrollable global economic factors affect all corporations to a certain extent, it 
is important for this study to present a detailed and specific analysis of the exposure 
effects on the airline industry. It is also essential to provide the historical background of 
the companies - SAA and Com air - and to highlight selected financial decisions 7 in 
order to present a better understanding of the financial performance and operational 
directions of the companies. 
Table 1 below provides the descriptive data for our study subjects. This table shows 
basic operational and financial comparative data for both SAA and Comair. Number 
Revenue Passengers indicates the number of revenue-generating travellers. Passenger 
Revenue represents the direct revenue generated by the company solely from the 
transportation of passengers. Total operating fleet shows the total number of the 
operating fleet before the balance sheet date, excluding future orders. The Turnover 
Revenue figure includes both domestic and international sales and is presented in South 
African Rand after converting the portion of Foreign Sales with the corresponding 
exchange rates. Headline Earnings per Shares (HPS), Net profit or Loss and Earnings 
per Shares (EPS) highlight the basic data of the airlines' financial performance. 
Comparison of Earnings to Revenue is calculated by dividing Net Profit by Sales 
Revenue to indicate Net Margin Line for both airlines. 
7 Both SAA and Comair have adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards from 2006. For 
the period under review, SAA and Comair applied accounting policies in accordance with South African 
GAAP standards. 
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Table 1 Performance highlight of SAA and Comair (1998-2005) 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
SAA 
No. Revenue Passenger 5,081 5,291 5,793 6, 129 6,128 6,520 6,510 6,851 
(thousand) 
Passenger Revenue na na na 8,889 11 ,178 13,688 12,926 13,163 
(R million) 
Total operating fleet 46 46 46 46 62 64 65 73 
Turnover Revenue 6,891 8,142 9,263 10,839 13,664 16,324 15,338 15,554 
(R million) 
Net profi t/loss (302) 10 349 408 2,144 (5,977) (8 ,610) 966 
(R million) 
Headline earnings/ (289) (269) (32) (735) 2,220 (5,985) (4,820) 1,132 
(loss) (R Million) 
Headline earnings/ (9. 1) (8 .6) (1 .02) (24) 71 (191) (166) 13 
(loss) per share (cents) 
Earnings/(loss) per (9.7) 0.3 11.17 13 69 ( 191) (296) II 
share (cents) 
Eamings/(loss) to (4.38) 0.12 3.77 3.76 15.69 (36.61) (56.14) 6.21 
Revenue 
Panel B: Comair 
No. Revenue Passenger na na na na na na na na 
(thousand) 
Passenger Revenue 8 514 609 977 1, 160 1,285 1,366 1,475 1,714 
(R million) 
Total operating fleet na na na 17 17 18 20 22 
Turnover Revenue 514 609 977 1,160 1,285 1,366 1,475 1,714 
(R million) 
Net profi t/loss 62 94 120 93 15 (23) (97) 76 
(R million) 
Headline earnings/ 67.43 93.66 120 97.44 15.96 28.56 50.82 72.66 
(loss) (R Million) 
Headline earnings/ 16.9 22.3 28 .6 23 .2 3.8 6.8 12.1 17.3 
(loss) per share (cents) 
Earnings/(loss) per 16.9 19.5 28.6 23.2 3.8 (5.7) (24.2) 19 
share (cents) 
Eamings/(loss) to 12.06 15.44 12.28 8.02 1.17 (1.68) (6.58) (4.43) 
Revenue 
*Source: Annual Financial Reports of SAA and Comair from 1998 to 2005. 
Inevitably, SAA, which is the larger airline with the larger fleet, generates more 
revenue and passengers, than Comair, due to the financial support from the government 
8 Comair states that the turnover is based on the provision of transportation services to passengers on an 
accrual basis in the period in which the services are rendered. 
17 
and its long history. However, the net losses for SAA were enormous on a comparative 
basis when both airlines performed dreadfully in 2003 and 2004. From the investors' 
and shareholders' perspective, Comair's performance was overall superior to that of 
SAA, with higher returns in HPS, EPS and Earnings to Revenue. 
From turnover revenue and net profit or loss, SAA shows higher proportion of expenses 
than Comair, which results in great net losses even though the revenue generated is high. 
Possible large expense accounts are salaries and wages, jet fuel costs and aircraft lease 
costs. In conjunction with the financial risk exposure studies, the number of aircraft 
plays an important role in airline operations. 
Table 2 below details the numbers and types of aircraft for SAA and Comair. Although 
SAA shows larger number of fleets, the Asset Turnover Ratios9, however, are less 
soundly compare to Comair's results. This indicates SAA performs worse in terms of 
generating revenue from asset utilization perspective, i.e. the airline may have not 
utilizes its capacity to the fullest. The table shows that SAA operates internationally to 
a much greater exte t than Comair, it is more hedged to currency risk as a greater 
proportion of its revenue is denominated in US dollars. 
More aircraft are needed in the future by purchasing, leasing, or upgrading, which 
increases the importance of asset management. From an operational perspective, 
different strategic financing solutions need to be applied to our study subjects in order 
to produce more effective asset utilizations. 
9 Asset utilization Ratio is used to compute comparable efficiency-of-utilization, or turnover, ratios for 
different categories of assets. 
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Table 2 Numbers of Aircrafts for SAA and Comair (2001-2005) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Panel A: SAA 
Boeing 737-200F na 2 (0) na 2 (0) 2 (0) 
Boeing 737-200Adv na 20 (0) na 15 (0) 10 (0) 
Boeing 737-800 na 16 (0) na 2 1 (0) 21 (0) 
Boeing 767-200 na 2 (0) na 0 0 
Boeing 747-SP na 3 (3) na I (I) 2 (2) 
Boeing 747-200 na 5 (5) na 0 0 
Boeing 747-300 na 6 (3) na 3(3) 3(3) 
Boeing 747-400 na 8 (3) na 13 (5) 13 (5) 
A340-200 na 0 na 5 (0) 6 (0) 
A340-300 na 0 na I ( I) 6 (3) 
A340-600 na 0 1(0) 7 (6) 7 ( I) 
A330-200 na 0 2(0) 2(0) 0 
A319-100 na 0 0 0 8 (0) 
Total 62 (23) 62 (14) 64 (15) 65 (14) 73 (17) 
Aircraft carry value (R' mi ll ion) 3,677 4, 107 1, 1034 6, 164 8,304 
Asset Turnover Ratio 2.95 3.33 1.48 2.49 1.87 
Panel B: Comair 
Boeing 727-200 6 0 0 0 0 
Boeing 737-200 II 0 0 I 0 (6) 8 (6) 
Boeing 737-236 0 2 (2) 0 0 0 
Boeing 737-400 0 3 0 3 (0) 3 (0) 
Boeing 737-300 0 na 0 3 (3) 5 (5) 
MD82 0 na 0 4 (0) 6 (0) 
Total 17(10) 17 18 20 22 
Aircraft carry value (R' million) 291 317 276 325 400 
Asset Turnover Ratio 3.99 4.05 4.95 4.54 4.29 
* The number of airline owned aircrafts is presented in brackets 
* Source: Annual Financial Reports of SAA and Comair from 200 I to 2005 .. 
2.1 South African Airways (SAA) 
SAA, as a leading and stated-owned airline, is currently based in Johannesburg and 
services more than 40 destinations, with more than 6.5 million passengers annually. 
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2.1.1 History 
SAA was established in 1934 when the South African government acquired the assets 
and liabilities of a private airline, Union Airways. A new national airline, South African 
Airways, was created as the aviation arm of the stated-controlled transportation 
network together with South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H). In 1999, SAA 
ceased to be a division of what had by then become Transnet and was incorporated as a 
company in its own right, South African Airways (Pty) Limited (www.flysaa.com). 
A milestone occured in 1994 as SAA introduced a premium rewards programme, 
Voyager, to encourage travellers to select SAA as their first choice in air transport. 
Through the programme, passengers obtained awards after accumulating a certain 
number of air miles. Since Voyager was launched, SAA has 1.8 million customers in its 
database, which generates nearly 26% of its total revenue (SAA Annual Financial 
Report, 2005). The average ticket price of a Voyager member is greater than the airline 
average and results in a higher ratio of travel in business and first class. 
In order to react promptly to the potential risk factors we have mentioned, SAA has 
access to funds on an annual basis in order to strengthen its strategic action in response 
to the risks highlighted by the company. The latest accessible fund indicated in the 2005 
Annual Report of SAA shows R4 billion compulsory convertible subordinated loans 
obtained from Trans et. This figure includes an amount ofZAR 2, 4 billion10 which 
10 The conversion ofR2 , 4 billion of the loans to equity is expected to restore SAA to solvency, and lifts 
the necessity for a subordinated loan, and facilitates the settlement of the remaining Rl , 6 billion to 
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needs to be recapitalized proportionally. There are several other decisions made by 
management to improve the operations and turn the continuous losses into profits, thus, 
it is essential for the current study to note certain operational highlights, occurring 
during the period of our study, as well as their impact on the financial statements. 
2.1.2 Accounting policies 
Accounting policies have been applied in accordance with South African Statements of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice ("GAAP"), which are consistent with prior 
c: h 1. . II years except 10r t e po tcy on mamtenance costs . 
By following GAAP, SAA accounts for all derivative financial instruments on a 
mark-to-market basis. Derivative financial instruments, which include currency and 
commodity forward contracts and options as well as interest rate swap agreements, are 
recognised in the financial statements on inception. Changes in the fair value of 
derivative financial instruments which are designated as effective hedges of future cash 
flows relating to firm commitments and forecasted transactions are recognised directly 
to equity. Changes in the fair value of derivative financial instruments that do not 
qualify for hedge accounting are recognised in the income statement as they arise. 
Transnet debts. 
11 SAA expensed all maintenance costs as and when incurred. From April 1, 2001 , SAA has expensed 
maintenance costs that are contractually required when paid and maintenance costs that are not 
contractually required as and when incurred. The effect of the change in the accounting policy amounted 
to a reduction in EBIT ofR114 million in 2002, and the results are not adjusted as the effect is regarded 
as not material. 
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In compliance with the requirements of the accounting statement AC128: Asset 
impairment, SAA has changed the basis of the valuation of its owned aircraft from the 
historical value to realisable market value in US dollar terms. The result of changing 
the accounting policies leads SAA to record impairment losses annually 12. 
An important risk management board was established to monitor credit, financial, 
operational, and exchange risks. As part of the strategic planning team, this committee 
filters out possible threats to the company and provides effective solutions. 
2.1.3 Financial highlights 
It is crucial to understand the composition of the financial structure of SAA and its 
main components. As its core business is serving the public as the government-owned 
airline transport company in the country, its revenues are mainly generated from 
passenger airline revenue 13 , cargo delivery, technical services, Voyager revenue and 
commission received, interest income and income from leased assets, insurance 
recoveries, and the release ofunutilised air tickets. Key initiatives for the revenue 
stream mainly focus on the alliances agreement and co-share network development 
with other airlines i the international market and cargo business operations. 
The operating costs mainly constitute fuel costs, repairs and maintenance, labour, 
12 SAA recorded impairment losses ofR3 554 million in 2004 and R35 million in 2003 , as partially 
resulting from the fluctuating exchange rate (Transnet Financial Report 2004). 
13 The 2004 Financial Report states that passengers contributed over 79% of total revenue, of which 
more than 58% was from international travellers. This shows that SAA is partially hedged against 
currency movement, as nearly 58% of its revenue is denominated in foreign currency. 
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maintenance material costs 14, outsourcing ofiT support, in-flight entertainment costs, 15 
and lease charges (operating and finance leases) on the aircrafts. 
The instability of the Rand impacts on the financial performance of SAA is severe, 
especially because most of the financial transactions are US dollar denominated 16• 
From a cash flow perspective, more foreign currency outflows occur than inflows, 
which decrease the value of revenue. The operating profit is negatively and 
significantly impacted by the declining Rand, as accounted for under SAA's current 
accounting policies, in relation to its net foreign monetary assets and sometimes in 
relation to derivative financial instruments. 
Although a continuous increase in shareholder value is a difficult task for global 
airlines, SAA showed sound performance by reaching a positive net asset value of ZAR 
2, 228 million (Appendix 1) in 2005, after two consecutive years of serious losses 17• In 
contrast, the Net Asset Value of SAA fell from a positive ZAR 6,028 million to a 
negative Net Asset Value ofZAR 1,410 million in 2003 due to the over ZAR 6,4 billion 
losses on its derivative positions and translation losses incurred in 2003. In addition to 
Appendix 1, Net As ets deployed by SAA, an additional financial highlight of SAA is 
outlined in Figure 1 below, being Total Income generated by SAA. This graph shows a 
constant growth in revenue from 1998 to 2005 except a minor decrease in 2004 of 6.4%, 
14 SAA has the largest maintenance centre in Africa and, on average, engine maintenance accounts for 
50% of maintenance costs (SAAAnnual Financial Report: 2002-2005). 
15 Entertainment cost was calculated at an average ofR70 million per year, mainly for purchasing the 
copyright to the entertainment programmes onboard the aircrafts (SAAAnnual Financial Report: 
2002-2005). 
16 SAA earns part of its revenue in foreign currency, which the part is affected negatively by the 
weakening of the Rand. 
17 SAA incurred losses on hedging forward purchases of plans because the Rand appreciated against 
Dollar. 
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Total Revenue Generated by SAA (1998-2005) 
Total Airline Revenue of SAA (1998-2005) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Year 
2004 2005 
*Total airline income increases significantly by 20.78% from 2001 to 2002, and decreases by 6.4% in 2004. 
*Source: SAA Annual Financial Reports from 1998 to 2005 
The improvement in the performance of SAA is also reflected by the significant change 
in the headline earning per share value from a loss of 166 cents in 2004 to a profit of 13 
cents per share in 2005. Figure 2 below presents the movement ofHPS and EPS of 
SAA from 1998 to 2005. The huge loss in 2004 is caused by a combination of extensive 
hedge losses incurred in the SAA hedge book, translations losses, provision in the 
commodity and currency price exposures, and first-time application of the new 
accounting policy18. The combination of these factors has resulted in SAA reporting 
consolidated losses of R6.3 billion in 2004. However, the earnings show an increase to 
positive values in 2005 which shows an improvement in the performance and delivers 
18 AC 133 : Financial Instruments, Recognition and Measurement is first time adopted by SAA in 2004. 
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Headline Earnings and Earnings per Share of SAA (1998-2005) 
Headline Earnings and Earnings per Share 
of SAA over 1998 to 2005 
Year 
*Source: SAA Annual Financial Reports from 1998 to 2005 
The losses of SAA lead Attributable heading income and revenue to massive decline 
over 2003 and 2004 for their shareholders. The impact of translation losses and 
derivative gains are graphed as Net Income in Figure 3 and Figure 4 below for SAA 
and Comair respectively to demonstrate the combined effect on the Operational Profit 
or Loss of the airlin s. 
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Figure 3 Operating Profit/(loss) and Net Income of SAA (2001-2005) 





2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
*Source: SAA Annual Financial Reports from 200 I to 2005 
Figure 4 Operating Profit/(loss) and Net Income of Comair (2001-2005) 


















However, the data in 2005 shows a change in profitability for SAA after so many years 
of losses. The financial reports indicate that SAA is starting to show an improvement in 
profitability for its shareholders, being the SA government, despite the challenges 
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facing the airline industry. To compare further of the financial measurement between a 
private and a state-owned airline, Return on Assets and Return on Equity are 
demonstrated in Table 3 below to show the airlines' performance. 
Table 3 Return on Asset and Equity of SAA and Comair- 2001 to 2005 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
SAA 
ROE 5.95% 18.33% -106.87% -104.14% 13.40% 
ROA 3.87% 13.57% -38.79% -51.37% 5.88% 
Comair 
ROE 25.20% 3.91% -6.53% -41.45% 24.44% 
ROA 11.97% 1.90% -3.20% -14.02% 9.42% 
* Source: Annual Financial Reports of SAA and Comair from 200 I to 2005 .. 
Comair shows aggregate higher returns over both Equity and Asset, except in 2002, 
which SAA performed rather, well due to several reasons mentioned above. 
2.1.4 Critical issues 
SAA has faced several critical issues such as financial risk factors and the threat of 
strategic movement by competitors from both the domestic and international markets. 
For instance, low-cost airlines, such as Kulula.com and 1 Time have been very 
successful in capturing market share on domestic routes previously dominated by SAA. 
To compete against ulua.com, the low fare airlines owned by Comair, SAA has also 
introduced its own low-cost airline, Mango, to compete with Kulula.com and 1 Time. 
Despite the competition in the market, the most uncontrollable and critical financial risk 
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factors may be fluct ating exchange rates, interest rate volatility, and increasing fuel 
costs (Loudon, 2004). 
Interest rate exposure has recently become a major expense item reported in SAA's 
financial statements, arising from the leasing costs of aircraft and network expansion 
(SAAAnnual Financial Statement, 2001-2005). 
The decision made by OPEC 19 to increase fuel prices also presented a significant 
challenge to airlines, especially where it is the Board of Directors' policy not to hedge 
its jet fuel price risk exposure completel/0 (http://www.opec.org/home/). The 
unpredicted increase in fuel prices can result in further losses for airlines. At the same 
time, airlines cannot pass the full impact of the increased fuel prices onto their 
passengers, as this may cripple the global transport industry. Many global airlines have 
tried repeatedly to raise fares in response to high fuel prices, but with little success 
(Smyth and Pearce, 2006). This problem comes back to a lack of pricing power in a 
very competitive market. The fuel price will then continue to be one of the most 
important factors in future financial planning for the airlines. 
Another current critical issue for SAA is the highly competitive environment in which it 
operates. This environment forces the airline to develop and implement its own unique 
19 There was a phenomenal increase of 40% in fuel costs between 2004 and 2005, heavily impacting 
SAA's operational costs. Economists predict that the increase in the price of fuel will continue for the 
foreseeable future. 
20 SAA's risk policy permits the organisation to hedge its jet fuel price risk exposures using the 
following underlying instruments: IPE Brent Crude Oil, IPE GasOil 0.5%S, GasOil FOB ARAB Gulf 
0.5%S and Jet Kerosene New FOB ARAB. It is SAA's policy to hedge jet fuel price risk exposures on a 
12-month rolling basis. 
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strategies in order to adapt to changes in the environment and to satisfy passengers' 
needs, though the market contains similar difficulties for all airlines. Table 4 below 
presents information on the performance of the strategies employed by SAA's major 
international competitors (SAA Financial Result Presentation, 2005). Different 
situations faced by airlines are set under the column "Action", such as techniques to 
deal with low cost operators and creating new networks or partnerships. Solutions are 
set out under the "Competitor's Strategies" column with a further column setting out 
the Examples oflnternational Airlines who are applying them accordingly. The actions 
taken by these competitors may create improved operations and improved levels of 
financial performance, which can serve as a good reference for SAA. 
Table 4 Strategies employed by major international competitors of SAA 
Action Competitors' strategies Example of Airlines 
Low cost operator D Creation of lower cost global networks D Emirates, Qatar 
D Redefinition of main business models D Aer Lingus, BMI 
Network and fleet D Increase network (re) segmentation D Air France, SAS 
(r)evolution D Improvement and innovation in long-haul D Virgin Atlantic, LH, 
(e.g. fleet model A380, 8777, A350) Emirates, BA 
Alliance and D Selective cooperation D LHISIA 
partnerships D Co-existence of bilateral agreements with D LAN Chile 
alliance membership 
Simplification D Growing cost-effective distribution D Easyjet, BA 
channels/e-commerce D Delta Airlines, American 
D Easy check-in and boarding (e.g. e-ticketing Airlines, Cathay Pacific, 
and RFID} Singapore Airlines 
* Source: SAA Financial Result Presentation, 2005 
In addition, as the bargaining power of passengers is becoming stronger than that of the 
carriers, competition has become more intense for SAA in the international market. 
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Thus, SAA may implement a series of improvements, such as a customer-focused 
approach, improved technology, building brand loyalty, and cultivating a reputation for 
safety, in order to pave the way for long-term profitability. However, in addition to this 
competition, there are other external challenges for the airline. SAA expresses concerns 
when facing the strengthening of Rand, global terrorism, and regulatory challenges in 
Africa Aviation. The key internal challenge which SAA faces is the inability of the 
return on the invested capital (ROC) to cover the weighted average capital cost 
(WACC). As the state-owned airline, SAA shows same result as other International 










Return on Capital of All Airlines - 1990 to 2000 
Return on Capital (ROC), 1990-2000, all airlines 
1990 Year 
- WACC -ROC trend 
*Data obtained from the SAA Annual Financial Report and Financial Review Presentation of2005. 
2000 
21 Airlines of this study delivered a median average annual return on invested capital (i.e. the return for 
the average finn) of 4.9% from 1996 to 2000. However, the weighted average annual ROC was 
calculated at 3.8%. The study shows that not one of the airlines was found to earn a return above its cost 
of capital. 
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Figure 5 above shows a draft movement of Return on Capital from 1990 to 2005 
presented by SAA and Comair in comparison to the lATA study in Appendix 2. SAA 
however, has identified key financial objectives which management will utilise 
continuously before the next financial milestone in order to improve the capital 
structure with turnaround strategies. 
2.1.5 Current structure 
After entering alliances with certain strategic partners, SAA has evolved from a 
low-frequency international airline (two or three flights per week to many destinations) 
to one that provides a leading and regular service through the routes offered by its 
partners. Existing partnerships increase the effectiveness of marketing and sales by 
enabling SAA to reach more than 700 destinations throughout the world, especially 
American, Asian, Australian, and African destinations (SAA Annual Financial Report, 
2005). 
Its application to join the Star Alliance in 2004 enabled SAA to offer passengers access 
to 700 airports in 128 countries, entry to over 550 priority reservation lounges, standby, 
and boarding, priority baggage handling, and flexible round-the-world fares (SAA 
Annual Financial Report, 2005). The multi-faceted benefits of this alliance are expected 
to generate substantial additional foreign income for SAA. This reduces the exposure of 
SAA to a depreciating Rand, as an increased portion of revenue will be denominated in 
foreign currency. 
31 
In order to improve the company's overall performance, a reconstruction programme 
has been implemented to prepare SAA to operate independently from Transnet (SAA 
Annual Financial Report, 2005). SAA will be spun off to the South African government 
(Department of Public Enterprises) within the next few years. The attainment of the 
company's strategic objectives, including sustaining operational profitability and 
increasing producti ity and efficiency, continues to be the core focus of SAA's 
management. Therefore, SAA views the forthcoming financial year as one of further 
consolidation (SAA Annual Financial Report, 2006). 
2.2 Comair 
Comair Limited trades under the brand British Airways (BA) and Kulula.com and 
provides domestic and regional air services in Southern Africa. Kulula.com is based on 
a strong Internet-powered reservation system. 
2.2.1 History 
In the 1940s, Commercial Air Services (Pty) Ltd (CAS) was formed to deliver general 
commercial aviation goods and services to the public. At an early stage for CAS, two 
distinctive divisions were formed: the airline division and the general aviation division. 
In 1967, the airline division was incorporated individually into a company known as 
Comair and at the same time it was first listed on JSE, whereas the general aviation 
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division transformed into the management of the franchise of Cessna aircraft:s in South 
Africa (www.comair.co.za). 
In 1995, CAS was deregistered and the equity in Comair was held directly by 
management and other investing shareholders. In 1998, Comair converted into a public 
company and was li ted on the JSE as Comair Limited (www.jse.co.za and 
www.comair.co.za) 
In recent years, in order to gain community participation and to create market 
awareness, Comair has integrated an ethical framework through several South African 
Social Performance programmes, such as by providing free transport to CIDA City 
Campus and South African Police Services (SAPS) members. Financial sponsorship 
includes providing financial support to Africa Book Connection (ABC) and The De 
Wild Cheetah Centre, as well as participation in a government project involving the 
South Africa Eastern Province Development Project. A Public Image Creation via Cow 
Parade Campaign has been implemented successfully throughout the country. Comair 
has also been involved in environmental protection projects such as Project 
Starfish/Reach for a Dream and charity programmes such as Helping the Children via 
Kulula.com. These marketing strategies have helped Comair establish a rapid but 
successful brand awareness within a short period, indirectly consolidating its domestic 
position in the market (Comair Annual Financial Statements: 2000-2005). 
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2.2.2 Principal accounting policy 
Financial risks are managed by using the following methods: interest rate risk is 
managed by fixing the rate on long-term loans (borrowing fund) and investing surplus 
funds (placement fund) with yields at market returns. The company hedges the foreign 
currency risk factor by entering into forward exchange contracts, but does not employ 
other derivative instruments. As SAA does not speculate on future currency movements, 
therefore takes only forward cover on foreign currency exposures. The financial 
statements report that the hedging of foreign currency risk has generally resulted in 
gains for the companr2• 
2.2.3 Financial highlights for Comair 
Competition in the domestic air travel market has become increasingly aggressive, and 
air travel is more affordable than ever. During the study period, Comair experienced a 
decline in domestic yields and an unprecedented market volume growth, with high peak 
performance of approximately 14%, and the turnover increased by 16% in 2005, as a 
result of the company gaining market share. 
According to the revenue recognition policy of Comair, revenue is recognised from all 
22 Approximately 40% of operating costs and 12% of revenue were calculated in foreign currency in 
2005 . Two forward exchange contracts were signed to commit to the purchase of two Boeing aircraft at 
US$14.4 million at an average forward rate ofR6.09/US$. The fair value at year-end reflected a 
favourable amount ofR9.3 million to the company. 
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airline-related transactions, arising mainly from the provision of transportation services 
to passengers. 
Figure 6 and 7 below of Airlines' HPS and EPS, show that shareholders investing in 
Comair gained better returns in comparison with SAA, except in 2002 when SAA 
generated the highest net profit of R 2.144 billion, which gives a final headline earnings 
per share of 71 .0 cents per share and 69 cents of earnings per share. In general, HPS 
and EPS show that Comair pays out more consistently with less fluctuation during the 
period of study. 
Figure 6 Comparison of Headline Earnings per Share (cents) 









1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
SAA -9.1 -8.6 -1.02 -24 71 -191 -166 13 
Comair 16.9 22.3 28.6 23.2 3.8 6.8 12.1 17.3 
[ ~ SAA -11- Comair [ 
*Source: Annual Financial Reports ofSAA and Comair from 1998 to 2005. 
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Figure 7 Comparison of Earnings per Share (cents) 
Comparison of Earnings per Share (cents) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
0.3 11.17 13 69 -191 -296 11 
19.5 28.6 23 .2 3.8 -5.7 -24.2 19 
I~ SAA ,.._ Com air I 
L_--------------------------~============~------------------~*S 
*Source: Annual Financial Reports of SAA and Comair from 1998 to 2005. 
The influence from the fuel price changes and exchange rate risk factors also affects the 
operational costs of Comair, particularly in 2005, when the operational cost was 
affected by a 32% average increase in the dollar price of Brent crude oil, which has had 
a significant impact njet fuel prices (Comair Annual Financial Report, 2005). The 
strong Rand also mitigated the high dollar cost of fuel and reduced the company's 
exposure to other dollar-based costs. 
The impact of the combined effect of the exchange rate and cost of fuelled to a serious 
loss for Comair in 2002 (Comair Annual Financial Report, 2002). Later Figure 8 and 9 
demonstrate Revenue and Attributable Earnings made by Comair from 1997 to 2002. 
The highlight on the tremendous decrease of headline earnings per share focuses on the 
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unprecedented challenges for the global airline industry exacerbated by conditions in 
Southern Africa and the economy linked to the collapse of the Rand and general market 
capacity. In general, Comair shows that the company increased its market share as the 
revenue grew constantly during our period of study despite the possible threats in the 
global aviation industry (Comair Annual Financial Reports, 1998 - 2002). 
Figure 8 Earning to Revenue Comair 1998-2005 







1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
-5 
-10 
*Source: Comair Annual Financial Reports from 1998 to 2005 
However, Figure 8 above also shows that the operating margin of2002 was eroded due 
to the negative cost impact of the weaker Rand on fuel , maintenance, insurance, and 
distribution costs. With half of Com air's operating costs linked directly to the U.S 
dollar, the 34% weakening of the Rand increased unit costs by 17% for the year 
(Comair Annual Fin ncial Report, 2002). 
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Figure 9 Attributable earnings made of Comair from 1997 to 2002 
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I• Attributable earnings (R' million) I Year 
*Source: Comair Annual Financ ial Reports from 1997 to 2002 
A constant increase in turnover revenue and passenger growth is a positive sign for 
Comair. In particular, yield growth during our study period helps to restore the low 
break-even load factors and fixed costs in operation. However, proper strategies for 
hedging against an increase in fuel prices and financial risk management is increasingly 
crucial for management. 
2.2.4 Challenges facing Comair 
Unlike state-owned SAA, Comair, as a private airline operator, has struggled for a 
considerable time d e to economic challenges and competition. Comair has shown 
superior management, as the company enables shareholders to gain minor returns on 
their investments, even during times when macro-economic factors have had a huge 
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impact in general. Comair has managed to achieve a continuously growing market 
share under the brands of British Airways and Kulula.com, in spite of strong 
competition and a legal case involving SAA (SAA Annual Financial Report, 2006) at 
the Competition Commission23 regarding abuse of dominance in terms of the 
Competition Ace4 (Competition Commission: Press Statement-S June 2007). This 
indicates that there will be more challenges in the future, as the combination of market 
tendency and financial risk factors will be more complex. 
2.2.5 Current structure 
Due to economic restructuring, the imperative to re-address the historical inequalities of 
the past and to increase the presence and ownership of previously historical 
disadvantaged South Africans, Comair has been active in the development and 
implementation of the BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) charter for Transport 
(Comair Annual Financial Report, 2003). This participation has affected the company's 
employment equity, training, management, social responsibility, and procurement 
practices. It is also unavoidable for Comair to consider the opportunities for Previously 
23 The Competition Commission was formed by the New South Africa Government, and aims to exercise 
the fundamental principle of competitive policy and law in SA to balance economic efficiency, 
socio-economic equity, and development. One of the objectives of the Competition Commission is to 
p,rovide consumers with competitive products and services (www.compcom.co.za). 
4 In 2007, a penalty of R55 million was paid to the Competition Commission by SAA as the airline had 
abused its dominance in contravention of the Competition Act with the following three matters. Firstly, 
SAA and Lufthansa are alleged to have been involved in price-fixing as a consequence of various 
bilateral agreements between the two airlines. SAA agreed to pay a fme of R20 million. Secondly, a 
complaint was formed b sed on an alleged fixing of fuel levy charges through an agreement by domestic 
airlines, resulting in an agreed penalty of R20 million payable by SAA and SA Express jointly. Lastly, 
SAA was fined for the abuse of dominance complaints by Comair regarding override commission and 
trust payment agreements between SAA and travel agents by coercing them not to deal with its 
competitors and the resulting fine was Rl5 million (www.compcom.co.za and SAAAnnual Financial 
Report: 2006). 
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Disadvantaged Individual shareholdings in the company (Comair Annual Financial 
Report, 2005). 
2.3 Common risks faced by the airline industry 
Like other airlines, SAA and Comair are exposed to significant risks which can affect 
the attainment of the companies' objectives and impact their financial performance. The 
risks can be seen as challenges from the external environment and these factors include, 
inter alia: 
• Exchange rate fluctuations; 
• Rising commodity prices and volatility in jet fuel prices; 
• Fluctuating interest rates; 
• The effect of pandemics; 
• Extraordinary events such as terrorist attacks; 
• Over-capacity in the market; 
• Robust competition on fares; 
• Strong government influence; 
• Highly cyclical environment, easily influenced by extraordinary events; 
• Operational and financial gearing; 
• Low entry barrier to get into the market but high exit barrier; and 
• Need for continuous capital investment25 . 
* Source: 2005 SAA Annual Fmancial Presentation, and Comair Annual Financial Report. 
25 SAA required an ongoing capital investment in planes as SAA's ability to invest is limited due to the 
company's fmanciallev rage level. For example, there is a compulsory convertible subordinated loan 
from Transnet which makes it difficult for SAA to retain income every year, as most of the cash 
generated is used to pay back the loans. 
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Effectively dealing with these challenges is critical to the improvement of the airlines' 
operations and shareholder returns. Although certain issues are not derived directly 
from financial perspectives, the value behind them can alter the financial performance 
in either the long- or short-term to a certain degree, such as obtaining the landing 
permits or new regulations from the governments. Thus, it is essential for us to 
understand those risk factors and consider their impact equally when we analyse and 
compare the two airlines. 
2.4 Extraordinary aviation events 
A downturn in SAA's financial performance commenced before September 11, 2001, 
and the terrorist attacks on New York's commercial centre significantly accelerated and 
further worsened th decline in the industry. Insurance costs increased by R200 million 
per annum as a result of this extraordinary event. However, Comair's market share 
remained steady, unlike those of other international airlines, after the incident on 
September 11, but the impact on the industry resulted in negative growth for the 
financial year in 20 1. 
The subsequent war in Iraq, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) during the first quarter of2003, and the worsening international economic 
climate have further increased the challenges facing the industry. These circumstances 
have resulted in many of the major carriers worldwide posting significant operating 
losses for the first and second quarters of 2003 despite the support provided by certain 
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governments to the aviation industry in their countries. SAA did not receive any extra 
support from the government, nor did Comair receive any government support. It might 
be difficult to look at the impact on SAA since it is a state-owned airline, but the 
investors' response t the aviation industry and Comair was one of reduced 
expectations, and was promptly reflected in the share price, which fell during the 
period. 
In the operational and economical environment, it is easy to observe numerous 
similarities between SAA and Comair. This research is aimed at evaluating the risk 
factors and analysing their impact by comparing the significance of the test results with 
our reference study. Comair may show sound performance, but the government support 
of SAA is not negligible. 
lATA, which conducted research (Smyth and Pearson, 2006) on international airline 
returns, indicates that the airlines in the study were unable to pay satisfactory returns to 
their own investors. Recommendations were made to improve international airline 
performance. Firstly, the industry should exclude heavy-handed government 
intervention, which damages airline profitabilitJ6. Secondly, inefficiencies and 
monopolistic power within the supply chain must be identified and addressed27 . Lastly, 
the airline industry itself must continue to seek its own efficiency gains, value creation, 
and productivity. This is achievable by constructing strategic movements in order to 
26 Government regulations and financial requirements, e.g. tax and land permit, decrease shareholders' 
returns on investment. 
27 Computer reservation system providers, manufacturers and major airports have exploited their 
monopoly position or impose charges that are wholly unjustified by their level of efficiency or by the 
risks they bear. 
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satisfy investors, customers, and the wider economy. 
The next chapter includes a literature review in order to provide a better understanding 
of the latest research on the financial risk exposures faced by the airline sector. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
The aviation industry, especially airline operations, used to be a profit-driven sector. 
However, one of the publications from lATA by Smyth and Pearce (lATA economic 
briefings No.4: 2006) states that Computer Reservation System (CRS) sector currently 
delivers largest average annual surplus of USD 660 million in the aviation industry, 
from the period of 1996 to 2004. Revenue declined in airlines operation is due to 
increased competiti n, deregulation, and risk factors which started to have a negative 
impact. For effective management of the risk exposures, Meulbroek (2002) suggested 
that airline companies implement corporate risk management by modifying their 
operations, adjusting their capital structure and using targeted financial instruments 
such as derivatives or hedging. The airline sector is one in which corporate hedging is 
likely to add value by minimising the under-investment problems (Carter, Rogers, and 
Simkins, 2002). In the study of corporate risk management, hedging adds value by 
reducing company taxes, minimising costs associated with reorganizing financially 
troubled companies, and preserving (or strengthening) management's incentives to 
invest in the company's future (Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2006). Later, this study 
will investigate the mechanism used by SAA for the mark-to-market hedging to 
maximise the company's revenue and shareholders' interest. 
The literature review of this study includes three main sections. The first section details 
the theories on expo ures and how these factors influence the company hedging 
policies. The second section discusses the major risk exposure factors: interest rate risk, 
currency risk, and fuel costs. The theories of how these risk exposures influence the 
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value and returns of the airlines are also summarised. The third section examines the 
results of research studies on the effects of using hedging instruments, which are 
utilised by most international airlines. We also include dividends as a variable in the 
value calculation process, which may affect the hedging decisions and have a certain 
impact on the value of the company. 
3.1 Theoretical perspectives 
The first stream of theoretical models includes those used to examine how the 
fundamental competitive structure ofthe industry affects the determinants of the risk 
exposures and vice versa. A firm is subject to "economic exposure" if the firm's value, 
as measured by the present value of its expected future cash flows, is sensitive to the 
expected changes in either of the exposures28 . 
A number of studies have investigated various determinants of exposure and the 
hedging policies to mitigate it (Adler and Dumas, 1984; Levi, 1994). The importance of 
supply and demand conditions in determining economic exposure has been emphasised, 
including the profitability of sales in the foreign country. Nevertheless, none of these 
studies has focused on a simple fact: in many forms of competition, and even in the 
case of a monopoly, the economic exposure of an exporting firm is proportional to the 
firm's net revenues based in foreign currency. Therefore, the firm does not need to 
know about the price elasticity of its product demand or its marginal costs. Thus, no 
revenue-based hypothesis has proven the influence of company structure on the 
28 Although all economic exposure measures the effects of unexpected changes in exchange rates on 
cash flows, all changes in the exchange rates were treated as unexpected in these studies. 
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financial risk exposures, based on the results of these studies. 
Other studies (Marston, 2001; Allayannis and Ihrig, 2001) have pointed out how the 
economic structure in general helps to determine the exposure effects of exchange rates 
on firms. This research emphasizes the prime importance of the competitive structure 
within the industry. Different forms of competitive structure have been used to examine 
how exchange rates affect the cash flows. The format includes a simple monopoly and 
duopoly (consisting of a dollar-based exporter and a local firm in the foreign/export 
market). Results show that, despite the format of the company, the firm is exposed to 
exchange exposures as long as the demand for its product is substitutable29 with that of 
the other firm, regardless of the forms of competition existing between the two 
compames. 
Several studies have demonstrated that net foreign revenues are the main components 
of a firm's exchange rate exposure. Marston (200 1) has argued that, for an oligopolistic 
firm, exposure is a function of the firm's own elasticity of demand and the 
cross-elasticity of demand with its competitors. Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002) 
showed that pass-through30 can impact exchange rate exposure because firms with 
inelastic demand can pass price changes on to consumers. The study also found mixed 
empirical support for a relationship between exchange rate exposure and its theoretical 
determinants, and :fl und that exposure is of negligible economic importance. However, 
further studies (Doidge, Griffin, and Williamson, 2002) have shown that a firm's 
29 Two goods are strategically substitutes if a rise in one finn's output lowers the marginal profit of the 
other firm (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985)) . 
30 Mark-up refers to the price over the cost margin, while pass-through refers to a firm adjusting its 
foreign currency price levels to offset the impact of exchange rate changes. 
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foreign activity is broadly and significantly related to exchange rate exposure and that, 
after controlling for this activity, large firms are more sensitive to currency movements 
than small firms (firm size as controlling variable). Exchange rate movements have an 
economically significant impact on firm value, based on the movement in average share 
returns, in ways that are consistent with theoretical studies. 
While this study demonstrates that exposure can be non-linear, offset within a firm, and 
complex, the theory has pointed to an economically important relationship between 
exchange rates and firm value. 
Another line of research includes the analysis of stock returns and empirical measures 
of individual risk exposures such as exchange rates (Jorion, 1990), interest rates 
(Sweeney and Warga, 1986), and gold prices (Tufano, 1998). A brief outline of each 
exposure will be discussed in the next section. 
3.2 Analysis of risk exposures 
This second section of the literature review includes those analysing share returns by 
measuring the empirical findings of corporate exposure to risks such as exchange rates, 
interest rates, commodity prices/ 1 and unlikely events. Exposure to these major 
financial risk factors is expected to impact the returns of the airline industry. Studies of 
risks such as exchange rate exposures (Jorion, 1990), interest rate risk (Sweeney and 
Warga, 1986) and commodity price risk {Tufano, 1998) indicate that the companies 
31 The focus is mainly n fuel prices, as this is the most relevant commodity for the airline industry. 
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studied are sensitive to these risk exposures to certain degrees. The airline industry is 
specifically characte ·sed by distinctive features such as: seasonal demand, strong price 
competition on both domestic and international routes, high capital investment and 
gearing levels, extraordinary events, estimation of price increases in commodities, high 
fixed costs of labour and equipment, and various regulatory impediments. 32 Due to the 
existence of these features, airlines may find it rather complex and intricate to 
effectively reduce the impact of the exposures by restructuring their operations to 
internally hedge or initiate other offsetting instruments. Therefore, most of the time, 
should something happen, the impact would be extremely serious on the financial 
performance of the airline companies when compared to the effect on other industries. 
The next part of this section includes an analysis of other studies discussing the 
potential consequences of interest rate, currency, and fuel price risks on airline stock 
returns. 
3.2.1 Interest rate exposure 
The interest rate is an important factor in the airline industry, as loans, operating leases, 
and financial leases are extensively used to finance the acquisition of airplanes. High 
financial leverage ratios33 are observed in the financial reports of airline companies. 
The sector is relatively capital intensive due to the nature of the assets. Equity 
investment can be difficult to source because of the high earnings volatility. Lower than 
32 Includes ownership control, landing rights, and commercial permits to load/offload passengers and 
f3o~d~s is particularly true if the present value of all long-term operating lease commitments is included 
as debt in determining airline debt-equity ratios. 
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average price-earning ratios, which are typically found in the airline sector, also reduce 
the scope for equity financing. 
Borrowing costs are directly related to interest rate changes. This is applicable if 
companies have variable rate leases and loans. Operationally and financially, there are 
also significant indirect costs associated with higher yields. The interest rate has a 
significant influence on the general economic conditions and progression of the 
business cycle (Bartram, 2002) in the company, with a consequential effect on 
consumer demand. This is especially applicable for industries such as aviation, where 
demand is cyclical and seasonal. 
Interest rate exposure is also related to the effect of financial distress on the airline 
industry. Financial distress derives from the following: the forced sale of assets such as 
the aircraft fleet at heavily discounted prices (Pulvino, 1998, 1999) because distressed 
airlines are forced to sell aircraft at below market prices, the purchase of new aircraft 
due to competition or contractual obligations, above industry average debt levels, and a 
decrease in revenue due to competition. Studies show that expected distress costs are 
related to the intere t rate exposures (Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2002). Higher 
interest rates may increase expected costs of distress, and this is particularly true for the 
airline industry, where operating and financial leverage is high and distress costs are 
substantial. Froot et al. (1993) have suggested that firms facing significant expected 
distress costs tend to under-invest. In essence, the under-investment cost is an indirect 
cost of financial distress, and decreases firm value. 
Since the studies show that both the direct and indirect costs of borrowing move in the 
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same direction as interest rates, the returns should be negatively correlated to interest 
rates. It is, therefore, expected that, in a later section of the study, interest rate exposure 
coefficients will be negative in relation to share returns. 
3.2.2 Currency Exposure 
Foreign exchange currency exposure has been defined as the sensitivity of the market 
value of the firm to unanticipated exchange rate movements (Dumas, 1978, Adler and 
Dumas, 1980, 1983). Therefore, exchange rate effects are dependent upon the firm's 
foreign exposure (determined by its operating revenue, cost exposure, and operating 
cash flow margin) as well as the use of foreign currency hedging instruments. 
Currency fluctuations and risk exposure to the currency factor are important 
management tasks for airline companies. Studies have confirmed the influence of 
currency risk on airlines for a number of reasons. Firstly, most of the expenses and 
revenues are deployed in several of the local and major currencies34, so the fluctuation 
of either currency affects the profitability of airlines in varying degrees. Secondly, 
borrowing costs may also be stated in different currencies, so the liabilities of the 
airline may change along with the equity. Thirdly, exchange rate levels and local 
competition influen e the exchange rate risk factor and income generation 
simultaneously, mainly due to the influence of tourism demand from overseas. This 
forces the airline company to adjust its overseas revenue accordingly. 
34 In the Group Financial Statement of 2005, SAA reported its operations in South African Rand; 
however, the operating costs increased 1.9% to Rl6 507 million as the result of the significant influence 
of fuel price and foreign exchange rate fluctuations. 
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Several researchers have analysed the theoretical determinants of exchange rate 
exposures under a variety of industry structures. These studies (Shapiro, 1975; Marston, 
2001; Williamson, 2 01; Allyannis and Ihrig, 2001, Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston, 2002) 
show that exposure is related to several variables as discussed below. 
Firstly, much of the revenue generated by the airline companies is subject to exchange 
rate exposure. Sales of tickets include both domestic and international passengers, with 
a mix oflocal and major currencies. Foreign operations include the settlement of the 
expenses and receipt of revenue in foreign currency, which may have to be converted 
into a third major currency, resulting in an additional level of exchange uncertainty. For 
example, SAA's operations in Rwanda, which are stated in Rwandan francs, must be 
converted into US dollars and then into South African Rand in the financial report35 . 
Secondly, the intensity of competition plays a crucial role, especially for the 
international routes, where price needs to be adjusted in line with the local airlines. As 
revenues are strongly influenced by exposure to movements in the exchange rate, price 
levels can offset the impact of exchange rate changes. Exposure levels can be 
influenced by industry-related factors such as mark-up and pass-through figures. 
Allayannis and Ihrig (200 1) have shown that exchange rate exposure has larger 
valuation effects during periods of higher competition and lower mark-ups, and is lower 
for more highly concentrated industries since mark-ups are higher. Thus, the 
35 Overseas sales ticket prices may be stated in US Dollars and converted daily into local currency, thus 
the customers are subject to part of the exchange rate risk. However, the local operating expenses are 
payable in local currency, which is difficult to adjust according to the daily exchange rate, and airlines 
need to absorb potential exchange rate losses. 
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industry-related factors strongly influence the exposure levels, and vice versa, from the 
competitive perspective. 
Thirdly, domestic and foreign inputs to production are substitutable in such a way that 
the market share is related to fluctuating exchange rates. A study by Bodnar, Dumas and 
Marston, (2002)36 indicates that, for any given market share, higher substitutability of 
the degree of the operational input to production decreases pass-through rates and 
increases exposures. The result of an increase in exposure is a decrease in market share, 
to some extent. 
Fourthly, the currency exposure movement has an ambiguous effect on revenues. 
Appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency reduces (increases) the borrowing 
cost of foreign-denominated debt and other foreign-sourced costs. Loudon (2004) has 
suggested that there is a positive correlation between the fluctuation of the local 
currency and the foreign-based costs. Foreign demand for international and domestic 
flights moves inversely with the value of the home currency. For example, if the Rand 
depreciates, demand for flights to and within South Africa from non-residents will rise. 
While domestic travel demand from residents also moves inversely with the home 
currency, demand for international travel changes directly. As the currency depreciates, 
residents are likely to select domestic travel ahead of international destinations. 
Competition in the airline industry is expected to prevent airlines from fully protecting 
their revenues from the impact of these currency movements. 
Fifthly, the degree of currency exposure is related to the multinational status, foreign 
36 Empirical support for the predictions of this model is limited, partly as a reflection of the difficulty of 
operationalising the theoretical variables. 
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sales, international assets, and degree of industry-level competitiveness of the airline. 
The significance of the exposure as measured by share returns, is dependent on the 
specific exchange rate, and varies over time (Dominguez & Tesar, 2004, Doukas, Hall 
& Lang, 2003). Airlines with foreign routes or various country offices are likely to have 
additional foreign sales, and airlines with holdings of international assets are more 
likely to be exposed to exchange rate movements. With all of these effects offsetting 
and counteracting each other, the final impact of the currency exposure is uncertain. 
3.2.3 Fuel price exposure 
Fuel price management is crucial since jet fuel costs comprise a significant component 
of airline operating costs. Statistics show that jet fuel costs constitute approximately 13 
per cent, on average, of an airline's operating costs. Thus, jet fuel price risk is 
economically meaningful to airlines37. Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2002) have argued 
that airlines also face an under-investment problem when profitable investment 
opportunities arise during times ofhighjet fuel costs. In general, there is a positive 
correlation between industry investment opportunities and jet fuel costs in the airline 
industry, while higher fuel costs are consistent with lower cash flow. Given that jet fuel 
costs are hedgeable, airlines with a desire for expansion may find value in hedging 
future purchases of fuel (Carter, Rogers, & Simkins, 2002). Research shows the return 
on assets (ROA) ca be used to measure profitability. Allaynnis and Weston (2001) 
have found a positive correlation between ROA and firm value. As the principal benefit 
37 Jet fuel costs are not adjusted for inflation in the analysis presented in this section. Adjusting jet fuel 
costs for inflation does not affect the general conclusions reached in this study. Further, the impact of the 
inflation on the jet fuel costs may be offset by fuel-saving measures used by airlines, such as using more 
fuel-efficient aircraft. 
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of fuel hedging by airlines comes from a reduction of under-investment costs, the 
empirical evidence shows a positive relation between hedging and value increases in 
capital investment. 
Loudon (2004) suggested that short-term cash flows are likely to be directly related to 
changes in fuel pric s due to price change inertia. Revenue responsiveness may initially 
be slow due to advance sales, pre-committed advertised package fares, pre-booked seats, 
and so on. From the intermediate-term perspective, the impact of fuel price exposure is 
likely to be more finn specific and to reflect varying degrees of competitive power 
and/or fuel efficiency across different airlines. In the longer term, much of the price 
effects are likely to be passed on, as all airlines face similar fuel costs. Carter, Rogers, 
and Simkins (2002) provided evidence that airline cash flows and share returns are 
negatively correlated with fuel price changes. Airline profitability is reduced by the 
direct and indirect costs associated with fuel prices. Since competition prevents an 
airline from perfectly undoing the impact of changes in fuel prices by adjusting its fare 
schedule or seat capacity according to the optimal mark-up, the fuel price exposure 
coefficient, discussed later in the current study, is predicted to be negative. 
3.3 Hedging in the airline industry 
This third section ofliterature review includes studies analysing the correlations 
between risk factors, corporate values, investment decisions, and the hedging effects of 
the company. The review focuses especially on studies of airline companies which 
focus on corporate values and the utilization of hedging instruments to minimize the 
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under-investment problems. 
Airline companies mainly use hedging instruments for managing fuel cost exposure. 
Studies show that airlines increase value by hedging their jet fuel price exposures 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2002). Guay and Kothari 
(2003) suggested that, in prior studies, most sampled firms who hedged by using 
interest rate and/or currency derivatives may have been unable to gain significant 
benefits from their derivative holdings. Therefore, hedging jet fuel prices is more 
effective since fuel prices are more volatile than prices of other underlying assets, 
particularly currencies38. Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2002) have shown that the 
annual fuel price volatility amounts to a monthly average between 1994 and 2000 of 
approximately 26 per cent. As a point of comparison, Guary and Kothari (2003) found 
the annualised volatility of the major currencies to be only 11 per cent. The cash flow of 
an airline is also sen itive to extreme jet fuel price changes when compared to changes 
in capital expenditures. Overall, airline exposure to fuel prices is economically 
significant, and considerable cost savings would be realised by airlines hedging in the 
event of an extreme price increase. 
From an investment perspective, hedging allows airline companies to fund investment 
when jet fuel prices are high and airline operating cash flows and values are down. 
There is a positive relationship between hedging and value, suggesting that investors 
view such investment as positive net present value projects. Airlines have incentives to 
hedge fuel exposure to protect their internal cash flow in order to meet future 
38 This may not be the case with SAA in our study because the South African currency is one of the 
firm 's exposures, which has a history of over 100% (annualized) volatility within the period of a week. 
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commitments to purchase aircraft (thereby avoiding financial distress). Thus, fuel cost 
levels tend to be negatively correlated with investment in new planes 39. Investors see 
the existence of the hedging premium40 largely as the result ofhedging on capital 
investment. Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) found that the value premium 
associated with hedging increases with the firms' level of capital investment. These 
conditions suggest that, if the market expects airlines to invest their marginal cash flow 
in positive net present value projects, then investors should place positive value on the 
fuel hedging policie of airline companies. Conversely, if investors view such 
investment unfavourably, hedging would have negative value consequences (Carter, 
Rogers, and Simkins, 2002). This result implies that investors value hedging by airlines 
when they expect hedging to protect the ability to invest in bad times. Thus, hedging is 
regarded as a positive attribute in the investment process of airline companies. 
Since jet fuel constitutes a large percentage of operating costs and the fuel price is 
highly volatile, airlines face a huge incentive to hedge fuel risk. Airlines also enjoy the 
opportunity to buy under-priced assets from distressed airlines during periods of high 
jet fuel prices and/or to protect the ability to meet previously contracted purchase 
commitments. Studies show that airlines employing jet fuel hedging trade at a premium, 
after controlling for other factors that affect value. Thus, hedging also adds value as the 
reduction of fuel price risk exposure is clearly economically significant (Allayannis and 
Weston, 2001; Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2002). The value of the interaction 
provides the vast majority of the hedging premium. 
39 However, increasingly new designs of aircraft are based on achieving improved levels of fuel 
efficiency and there will increasingly be a motive to purchase new planes to achieve improvements in 
fuel efficiency. 
4° Calculated from the added fum value attributable to hedging by the fum. 
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Corporate value and hedging research studies (Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2006) on 
U.S. Airlines indicates that the most active hedgers of fuel costs are the larger firms in 
the sample with the least debt structure and highest credit rating41. Smaller airlines are 
less active possibly due to a lack of either sufficient resources or the strategic foresight 
to acquire a derivative hedging capability, and airlines' relatively low costs of financial 
distress. Large airlines may have higher financial distress costs, but such firms may also 
have the most to gain from hedging. 
3.4 Controllable variables 
3.4.1 Dividends 
In addition to the risk factors mentioned above which affect firm value, dividends are 
one of the control variables consistent with the regression analysis of Allayannis and 
Weston (2001), who included a dummy variable if the firms paid a common dividend 
during the current year. Firms with foreign sales show a negative relation between the 
dividend dummy and firm value, while firms with zero foreign sales show a positive 
relation between the two. Firms paying dividends are less likely to be capital 
constrained (Fazzari , Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988) and, therefore, may over-invest by 
accepting negative net present value projects. On the other hand, dividends may be seen 
as a positive signal from management (especially in an industry that has experienced a 
significant number ofbankruptcy filings). Additionally, the initiation or increase 
41 Study uses S&P Credit Rating System for Senior Debt of Sample Airlines. 
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(elimination/reducti n) of a dividend is likely to be seen as positive (negative) by the 
market (Allayannis and Weston, 2001). 
Most previous studies have focused on the existence of a single risk exposure such as 
interest rate risk or only the exchange rate exposure. For the transportation industry, 
studies have mainly emphasised jet fuel price hedging, ignoring currency and interest 
rate risk (Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2002). In contrast, the current study follows the 
methods employed by Loudon (2004) to examine interest rate, currency, and fuel price 
exposures simultaneously. Many studies have focused either on aggregate factors from 
the industry or on in-depth research into the broad spectrum of the individual 
companies. The result of these studies may disclose the effect of the exposures to the 
company or industry without controlling for the industry effect (Williamson, 2001). The 
current study focuses on the analysis of the company within a single industry in a 
specific context. 
The next chapter will focus on the data collection process, methodology used, and the 
source of database, highlighting the critical occurrence of financial risk exposures 
included in this study. This study will also extract certain important data from SAA and 
Comair for visual comparison in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. Data collection, technical analysis and methods 
This chapter explains the research methodology involved in the data collection, 
including the types and resources. This is followed by a technical analysis of the data 
chart, which explores the patterns of the risk factors. A table of selected airline 
characteristics presenting a ratio analysis of the financial statements serves as a helpful 
tool to compare the operational performance and anticipated future conditions of the 
airlines. Lastly, detailed formulae are outlined, and linear and non-linear risk exposure 
methods are employed to analyse the correlations between the factors and the resulting 
effects on airlines returns. 
4.1 Data collectio 
The sources of data in this research differ from the study by Loudon (2004), with data 
collected from several South African and international databases. The database used for 
Loudon (2004)'s study- DataStream (DS)- does not have sufficient historical 
information covering South African economic data, nor the equity price information for 
our study objects. Therefore, the data in this study are collected from numerous sources, 
including the JSE Securities Exchange and the South African Reserve Bank. 
Certain daily raw data were collected and averaged out into weekly data such as the 
South African Prime interest rates, exchange rates, jet kerosene prices, and the share 
price of Comair. Primary lending interest rates were collected from the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB), while exchange rates and fuel prices were collected from the 
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McGregor BFA Mweb Database (BFA). The daily individual share return of Comair 
was collected from JSE and Computer Share (CS), and the annual financial reports of 
SAA were extracted from the SAA and Transnet websites. Major airline42 return data 
were obtained from Interactive Data Corporation, with the U.S. and Canadian historical 
stock prices and US indices prices provided by CSI, Inc, U.S. historical mutual fund 
and industry prices provided by Media General Financial Services, and the S&P Airline 
(industry) Index provided by Index Services at Standard & Poor. These data are used 
for indicating average market returns in linear and non-linear calculations as well as 
providing benchmar s for our study objects. 
Data are collected fl r the period of22nd July 1998 to 31 st December 2005, and the 
starting date of the sample corresponds with the public listing date of Comair on the 
JSE. As SAA is a state-owned unlisted airline, the annual report is published but the 
daily equity returns are not. This gap of missing information is overcame by obtaining 
the measurement of return on investment of SAA from the Annual Financials and 
standardised data into periodically returns in order to conduct comparison with Comair. 
Although the shareholder's composition various in these two airlines, there are however 
still sufficient similarities exist amongst the two companies. Besides the Airline 
Characteristics included in this study, both SAA and Comair have been financially 
supported by the South African and British Government respectively; both airlines are 
now covering high end and low end market with similar strategies; and are highly 
sensitive to currency fluctuation and jet kerosene price exposures. Data used in this 
42 Major airlines include: World Air Holdings, North West Airlines Corp, Delta Airlines, Continental 
Airlines Class B, China Southern Airlines Co Ltd, China Eastern Airlines Corp, British Airways, AMR 
Corp, and Air France ADS. 
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study can be categorized into daily (closing prices of exchange rate, jet kerosene price, 
S&P Industrial Index, and the listed share price of Comair), weekly (major airline 
returns), monthly (South Africa Prime interest rate) and annually (annual financial 
statements) information. The Industrial Index in S&P discloses the global listed airlines 
and the industrial performance. Although South African airlines may not be significant 
in the contribution of the weight, it still serves as a useful global indicator. 
Short-term government interest rates or bonds are often employed to depict the risk-free 
rate indicator, which is used to compute excess returns. The three month Treasury bill 
rate is used for Comair in this study as the risk-free interest rate indicator whereas 
SAA 43 states that the domestic loan interest rates44 are obtained from South African 
Government to secure the aircrafts. Excess returns are calculated and reflected in the 
South African Rand (ZAR) by both airlines. Although companies may determine excess 
returns using long-t rm bond yields, the current study uses the short-term rate, as this is 
more in line with CAPM. Measures of interest rate risk are proxied by changes in the 
long-term fixed interest rate rather than the short-term counterparts, as the majority of 
airline debt financing is long-term and denominated in local currency. 
As these airlines generate their income and revenues in many different currencies, our 
study airlines use USD and ZAR denominate debt structures. Loudon (2004) uses 
changes in the trade-weighted indexes of the relevant domestic currency to assess 
43 SAA obtained a domestic loan with an effective interest rate at I 0.3%, which was secured by the 
aircraft. The foreign secured loans in US Dollar used interest rate between LIBOR +2 and LOBOR flat, 
secured by the aircraft and capitalised lease improvements paying interest between 2% and 6% per 
annum with repayment between 2005 and 2012. (SAA Financial Annual Report: 2005) 
44 Both Comair and SAA used the domestic effective interest rate method for borrowing costs to achieve 
a constant rate of interest on the remaining balance. 
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foreign exchange risk in his study, though this method appears to be the most useful, 
but imperfect. In our study, the financials of the airlines are expressed in ZAR resulted 
from a translation at the average exchange rates, unless the fluctuation was significant. 
Specifically with SAA, exchange rate risk is covered by managing the exposures in its 
cost base denominated45 together with cash collection and conversion strategies at 
marked to market on daily basis (SAA Annual Financial Report: 2006). In addition, as 
major debt, equity and purchase of assets are conducted in ZAR and USD respectively, 
thus, the daily closing rate of ZAR to USD is used to assess foreign exchange risk, as it 
appears to be the most appropriate figure for this study. 
Lastly, the differences in fuel prices are measured from changes in the USD price per 
barrel of jet kerosene, F.O.B. Singapore, which is used by Comair and SAA. This is in 
align with Loudon (2004)'s method and which the jet kerosene price is converted into 
equivalent ZAR value by using the daily USD to ZAR closing rate to minimise 
currency effects from fuel price effects. 
4.2 Technical analysis 
Appendix 3 in this study discloses the daily movement of the key financial risk 
variables throughout 1998 to 2005. Appendix 3.1 shows the South African Prime 
interest rate in percentage per annum; Appendix 3.2 presents the exchange rates of one 
US Dollar to the South African Rand at a weekly rate resulting from the average of the 
daily closing rates. Appendix 3.3 graphs the jet kerosene price per barrel in US Dollars. 
45 Calculating revenue and expense in the currency it received and natural hedges exist in its business 
operations. 
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In Chapter 2, the negative effect of the weakening of the Rand in 2002, which led to 
significant increases in fuel prices for the airlines, was discussed. Therefore, Appendix 
3.4 demonstrates the price movement of jet kerosene per barrel together with the effect 
of the corresponding exchange rate. From these figures, we see that the trend of fuel 
prices in 2002 is higher than Graph 3.3 of the same appendix, and this impact somehow 
causes South African companies to incur enormous losses in 2002, including the 
companies in our studies. These graphs allow readers to visualise the patterns of the 
risk factors and their impact on the returns, which this study analyses, as well as the 
possible gains for the airlines from managing these risks effectively. 
Figure 10 below graphs the average performance of the sample of major global 
airlines46 . Two trend lines display the average return in US Dollars and its equivalent 
value in Rand value to compare with our study subjects. In 2002 the Rand collapsed 
against the US Dollar and in Rand terms, resulted expecting a dramatic increase in 
Rand returns as the Rand fell and the returns are stated in US Dollar terms. Original, 
detailed Individual Global Airline Performance is listed in Appendix 4 in US Dollars. 
Both Figure 10 and Appendix 4 clearly show that the global airlines experienced 
negative material impacts from the terrorist attacks which resulted in general 
performance of the hare price declining from September 11, 2001 onward. The attack 
caused an instant 46% decrease of global airline share value with no signs of a price 
increase afterward. 
46 Major Airline Industry Returns are used to signify the global industry returns and have been converted 
into ZAR at the relevant exchange rate. ZAR is used instead ofUSD as it is the primary currency used by 
both airlines. Therefore, it is unnecessary to convert into USD as Loudon did. 
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Figure 10 Share price of the global airline industry from 1998 to 2005 
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Unlike the performance ofSAA and Comair, the impact ofthe weakening of the Rand 
in 2002 shows a min r effect on the weekly prices of the global airlines compared with 
the degree of changes which the terrorist attack caused. The diminutive effect was 
partly caused of the low share prices after September 11 , 2001 , which led to a lesser 
extent of fluctuation then what we expected initially. 
Figure 11 below shows the S&P 500 Airline Index from 1998 to 2005, in which the 
moving pattern is similar to Figure 10 above, and the S&P initially increased for a short 
period before decreasing in March 2003. Appendix 5 displays the S&P500 Index 
adjusted Closing Price for the period of 1997 to 2005 to compare with the S&P 500 
airline industry performance. Both S&P graphs demonstrate the direct impact of the 
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terrorist attack on the closing index and value, which matches with global airline 
performance in Figure 10 and Appendix 4. The effect of the attack shows in Figure 11 
and Appendix 5, which reflects a decrease in their value of28% and 11.5%, 
respectively, immediately following the transaction date of September 11, 2001. 
Figure 11 S&P 500 Airlines (Industrial) Indices 
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In Figure 11 , S&P 500 Airlines shows growth until February of the following year after 
the sudden performance decrease from the attack. This encouraged investors to rate the 
Aviation Sector as a revitalising industry for the period. However, the global economy 
suffered a setback and this was reflected by the weak performance in the airline sector. 
Thus, the performance in March 2003 decreased after a short peak and remains low 
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until the end of the study period. Although the S&P 500 Index ascends gradually, the 
Airlines Indices indicates no sign of increasing their value. This phenomenon was 
regarded as a dark and frustrating period for the global aviation sector, including our 
study subjects47 . 
The share price patterns of the companies included in this study are presented in Figure 
12 below with the Weekly Closing Price ofComair from 1998 to 2005. To be more 
specific and in contrast to inspecting the effect of the incident of September 11, the 
serious losses which Comair disclosed tend to be, in general, unconnected to the 
terrorist attack. For other global airlines, the terrorist attack represented the 
commencement of a recession for the sector. 
Compared to the decline in the major airlines' performances, Comair shows growth 
before the year 2000, but the growth started in 2005 after a long recession period from 
2002 to 2004. In contrast, SAA reported significant losses on the shareholders' 
investment until the first quarter of 2004, when the exchange rate effect started to 
attribute positive impacts for the company. Improvements in macroeconomic conditions 
in 2004 resulted in positive effects for the aviation sector and have led to a reawakening 
of global aviation and an improvement in financial performance. 
47 International study conducted by lATA (2006) also illustrated that, globally, airlines have suffered net 
financial loses of over USD 40 billion between 2001 and 2005. 
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Figure 12 Weekly Closing Price of Comair from 1998 to 2005 
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The movement of airline returns is analysed in Figure 6, 7, 10 and 11 , for SAA and 
Comair, global airlines, and the S&P Index, respectively. Declines in performance 
returns are noticed for SAA, Comair, and the global airline industry, especially around 
2001. The financial performance of airlines did not stabilise and improve until2004. As 
this common trend applied to both the domestic and international major airlines, it is 
noticeable that changes in financial risk factors might have had a positive influence 
during certain periods which led to an improvement in the aggregate performance of the 
airlines. 
It is essential to investigate the trends of the financial risk factors during the study 
period. The movem nts of the exchange rate, interest rate, and oil prices are graphed in 
Appendix 3 consistent falling interest rate effect is shown in Appendix 3.1 , except for a 
period of rising rates during 2002. The increase of the rates started immediately after 
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mid-2003 , followed by a decrease within the next two quarters. Financial analysts 
explain the decrease in the interest rate and a resurgent economy occurring from 2003 
as the result of foreign investment and encouragement of local entrepreneurship, 
reflected by GDP growth to reach the highest figure of 5% (2005) within the decade. 
The movement of exchange rates, which fluctuated to an enormous degree, especially 
when it reached the highest depreciation point within our study period at ZAR13.65 to 
USD 1 at the end of 2001 and the highest appreciation point ofZAR 5.52 to USD 1 in 
1998, is illustrated in Appendix 3.2. The exchange rate, as shown in the figure, mostly 
remained within the range of ZAR 5.50 to ZAR 8.30 to USD 1, except for a sudden 
depreciation which resulted in an inverted "V" shape in 2001. This incident had 
significant impacts n corporations which had major transactions in foreign currencies. 
Currency risk is one of the most significant economic risk factors in South Africa, as 
the daily rate can fluctuate up to 10% occasionally or even up to 40% within a week 
(during November 2001). Financial analysts also predict that the South African Rand 
will be one of the most risky currencies to trade in for the next few years. This 
encourages corporations to use efficient risk management instruments besides hedging 
for jet fuels in order to protect the company's profits and reduce possible currency 
fluctuation risk. 
In addition to excha ge rate changes, fluctuations in jet kerosene prices is also a crucial 
factor for airline companies, especially when the jet kerosene prices are constantly 
increasing, as presented in Appendix 3.3 and 3.4 in Appendix 3. There is a substantial 
upward growing tre din fuel prices from levels below USD 30 in late 1998 to levels 
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above USD 106 in October 2000. Another upward intermediate peak trend is from the 
level below USD 65 in October 2003 to the highest levels above US 203 in September 
2005. Appendix 3.3 hows a sudden change in fuel prices in 2003 and reflects the 
commencement of a period of continuous incline, which was the result of boycott 
action from OPEC members against the declaration of the Iraq war (www.opec.org). 
The constant increase48 in fuel prices has a negative impact on the future financial 
performance of airli es and indicates their vulnerability to this uncontrollable factor. It 
is also important that this study investigate imported jet fuel prices in terms of South 
African Rand values. Thus, the combined effect of fuel prices and the exchange rate is 
presented in Appendix 3.4, which shows that the gradient of movements is steeper as 
compared to Appendix 3.3. In other words, the exchange rate risk factor is crucial and 
may have a negative impact on South African airline companies when they purchase jet 
fuel with Rand. 
In order to perform basic financial analysis of the individual airlines and to follow 
Loudon (2004)'s research, this study selects certain key operational characteristics of 
SAA and Comair, where figures are collected from the annual reports and presented in 
Table 5 below. These measures are relevant for assessing the potential importance of 
exposure to interest rate, currency, and fuel price risk. The table reports statistical data 
sourced from the airlines' annual reports. SAA and Com air end their financial fiscal 
year on the 31 st of March and the 301h of June, respectively. Foreign Sales is the 
percentage of total revenue derived from geographic regions outside the domestic 
48 The constant increas in fuel prices resulted from the increase in OPEC numbers, where every country 
urges consolidating the World Fuel Market Price, declaration of war in the Middle-East, and the forecast 
of supply shortages within the next fifty years. Therefore, it is foreseen that fuel prices will continue to 
increase until a substitutable resource has been discovered and is used on a sustainable basis. 
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country, with the main country in this study being South Africa. Fuel Cost shows the 
cost as a percentage of total airline operating expenditure, excluding depreciation, 
amortisation, and interest. Unlike Loudon's (2004) study, Debt to Total Asset ratio is 
used instead of Gearing ratio as South Africa government has subordinate loans to SAA 
which become effectively equity finance on the balance sheet. Off-gearing is the same 
as Gearing, except that it also includes off-balance sheet financing49 . In this study, this 
covers the sum of tot 1 assets, total liabilities, and the deferred tax value. Interest Cover 
is earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by net interest expense. Long-term 
liability is the ratio of non-current debt to total liabilities, as recorded in the balance 
sheet. Revenue Seat Factor is the ratio of revenue passenger kilometres to available seat 
kilometres. As some f the required data is unavailable due to the confidential 
disclosure policy of the company, Loudon (2004)'s results are extracted in Appendix 7 
to compare to the characteristics of our study subjects. 
Table 5 below shows that Foreign Sales, which is an important factor in determining 
sensitivity to currency exposures for both airlines, shows diversified results due to 
different company strategies and differences in operations. Comair reflects limited 
foreign sales data in the analysis50 by only showing 12 per cent in 2005, while SAA 
has substantial international revenues. However, the domestic market of Comair reflects 
a growth of approximately 14 per cent in 2005 as the result of focusing on the domestic 
market and a growth in market share due to the low prices ofkulula.com and quality 
49 Off-balance sheet item refers to an asset or liability which is not reflected on the balance sheet because 
of management judgement or accounting policies. In the airline sector, this relates mainly to the use of 
operating leases to finance the acquisition of aircraft. 
5° Comair states that all foreign currency transactions are recorded at the exchange rate ruling on the 
transaction dates. Therefore, the effects of the foreign exchange on the daily international sales are 
absorbed and reflected in the earnings. 
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service of British Airways. As SAA is more focused on the international market, foreign 
sales revenues range from 34 per cent (1999) to 59 per cent (2005) ofthe company 
turnover, which is higher than Qantas but lower than Air New Zealand (Appendix 7) if 
we compare the results to those of Loudon's (2004). Differences in foreign sales mean 
that the impact of exchange rate risk exposure has different degrees of influence for the 
airlines. SAA may encounter more currency exposure risks than Comair in terms of 
sales revenues. Having foreign sales may, however, result in a greater opportunity for 
the airlines to benefit from natural hedging and reduce the net foreign currency 
exposure effects due to costs being stated in foreign currency. 
Table 5 Airline Characteristics of SAA and Comair 
Fiscal Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Panel A: SAA 
Foreign Sales n.a. 34.7 34.9 36.2 55 41.5 58 59 
Fuel Cost n.a. n.a n.a 19.5 18.8 21.2 19.1 20.8 
Debt to Asset n.a. n.a n.a 17.26 20.24 23 .64 27.32 58.50 
Gearing Incl. Off n.a. n.a n.a 46.8 53 .1 -272.5 -169.8 -542.2 
Interest Cover n.a. n.a n.a 1.7 5.8 -12.5 -12.1 2.8 
Long-term Debt n.a. n.a n.a 26.5 29 .1 21.5 23.3 52.8 
Revenue Seat Factor n.a. n.a n.a 66.6 67.1 68.4 67 .5 70.4 
Panel B: Comair 
Foreign Sales n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Fuel Cost 7.9 9.6 8.3 9.3 11.2 15 20 26 
Debt to Asset -0.83 28.57 23.37 23.86 21.14 1.41 21.87 26.33 
Gearing Incl. Off -1.6 62.5 45 50.3 43 .5 2.9 64.6 68.3 
Interest Cover 120.7 40.1 5.7 3.5 0.4 -1.3 -2.7 4.8 
Long-term Debt n.a. 47.1 43 48 45 .3 6 41.7 35.8 
Revenue Seat Factor n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
*n.a. indicates data is not avai lable 
*Source: Annual Financial Reports of SAA and Comair from 1998 to 2005 
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In regards to jet fuel cost exposure, both airlines have reported that fuel costs are a 
major component of airline operating costs. Fuel costs account for between 19 and 21 
per cent of the total operating expenditure for SAA, and 8 per cent to 26 per cent for 
Comair51 • An important finding in this data is an increase in the percentage of this ratio 
in the latter period for the airlines. Especially for Comair, the proportionate cost is 
slightly higher and the gradient ofmovement52 is steeper during our study period. 
Comair's 2005 Fina cial Report shows a 32 per cent average increase in the dollar price 
of jet kerosene, excluding the effect of the fuel surcharge on British Airways ticket sales, 
which may have contributed to the partial recovery of the fuel price increase. Both our 
study airlines have deployed accounting policies to implement risk management system 
effectively in order to assist airlines' risk department to measure the diverse risks that 
the airlines face. To cover jet fuel price risk53 , SAA has a Board approved policy of not 
hedging its fuel price risk exposure completely (SAA Annual Financial Report, 2005). 
The policy hedges partial jet fuel price risk exposures by using derivative contracts, 
which are marketed to market and settled in cash54. On the other hand, Comair 
categorises transactions denominated in foreign currency under foreign currency risk 
management. Comair uses forward exchange contracts to manage exchange rate 
exposures and does not speculate in derivative instruments (Comair Annual Financial 
Report, 2005). However, the increase in the fuel component for Comair has been 
51 Comair recorded a huge difference in fuel proportion from 8% to 26%. This is due to the fact that 
Comair commenced business with a few jets, which translated into a lower proportion of fuel expenses 
compared to SAA, but as the number of jets increased, fuel weight in total expenditures increased 
accordingly. It is also important to notice that, SAA may have more planes which are generally newer 
than those ofBA, kulula.com and new planes are more fuel efficient. 
52 SAA and Comair fue l price movement gradients are 0.6 (3/5 years) and 1.6 (8/5 years), respectively. 
53 Jet fuel price risk is derived from the increased cash costs due to an increase in Brent crude oil prices 
which leads to a concomitant increase in Brent crude oil by products, i.e. jet fuel. 
54 SAA' risk policy permits the airline to hedge jet fuel price risk exposures on a 12 month rolling basis 
(Financial Report, SAA, 2005). 
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mitigated by the strong Rand, which has reduced the effect of the high dollar cost of jet 
fuel. The addition of aircraft on an annual basis as well as the lack of risk management 
of fuel costs may contribute to this material increase. One of the driving considerations 
for aircraft procurement or the replacement decision is the fuel efficiency of each 
aircraft model. This may result in airlines attempting to deal with fuel price risk by 
replacing older planes with newer, more fuel-efficient planes. In the current study, it 
appears that Comair has not implemented specific risk management policies to deal 
with the fuel price exposure, but has implemented hedging policies to deal with other 
risk factors, which will be reviewed later. 
Table 5 also shows that both airlines are relied heavily on the usage of balance sheet for 
capital financing or other purposes. The Debt to Asset ratio increases during the study 
period for both airlines, however, Comair shows a raise from 2004 as the utilization in 
debt facility has been increased to cover transactions such as collateral covering 
security or bridging other instalment sale agreement. 
Having observed th interest rate exposures, both airlines show extremely high gearing 
ratios, with debt being predominately of a long-term nature. The result of the gearing 
ratio, including off-balance sheet debt, ranges from negatives to 52 per cent for SAA 
and from 48 to 1 per cent for Comair. For SAA, with negative figures reflecting its 
shareholders' interest from 2003 to 2005, the gearing indicates that debt exceeds 
shareholders' equity value and that the airline had extremely high interest rate 
exposures during those years. However, Transnet and the government had provided 
security guarantees, which amount effectively to equity, as the government is the 
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shareholder of SAA. Thus, Transnet has pledged that SAA receive R4 billion 
compulsory convertible loans to balance the gearing ratio for the future, as SAA is 
vulnerable to further interest rate risk. The average year-end ratios oflong-term debt to 
total debt, as recorded in the balance sheet over the sample, was 53 per cent for SAA 
and 48 per cent for Comair. Thus, with its higher gearing levels, coupled with a much 
lower interest cover, SAA shows higher exposure to interest rate risk than Comair for 
the entire study period. 
Revenue seat factors are deployed as another key operational characteristic to evaluate 
the performance results of risk management policies and practices, including changing 
the price structure and other capacity decisions. The revenue seat factor is calculated as 
the ratio of revenue passenger kilometres (RSK) to available seat kilometres (ASK), 
and provides measures of capacity utilisation. An average annual revenue seat factor is 
68 per cent for SAA, as shown in Table 5. Comparatively, both Qantas and Air New 
Zealand have a higher rate in every year in the sample of Loudon's (2004) study 
(Appendix 7). From the perspective of global aviation, this shows that SAA has less of 
a competitive advantage compared to the other international airlines. 
Revenue seat factor is unavailable for Comair, but with regards to risk management and 
its flexibility in adjusting strategic decisions, the airline should concentrate on effective 
risk management at this stage. According to Comair's annual report in 2005, financial 
risk management only covers interest rate, credit, liquidity, and foreign currency risks. 
The company states that there is no speculation in derivative instruments and all the 
foreign contracts are supported by underlying transactions. 
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4.3 Data Methods 
After extracting data from the financial reports, the next data analysis entails examining 
the significance of the risk exposures, which are conducted by employing both linear 
and non-linear coefficient methods according to Loudon (2004). Statistical definitions 
and their applications will be detailed to explain the reasons for their use. 
4.3.1 Linear risk exposures 
Compared to internal managers, who have access to inside information for the prompt 
evaluation of sensitivity to key business risks, external analysts are often restricted to 
limited public data such as share prices, market portfolios, and macroeconomic data. 
The use of the linear risk exposures method is thus derived from the external analysts 
who use the analysis method on the foreign exchange risk in Adler and Dumas (1984)55 
to measure the operational measures of exposure to other financial risks. Adler and 
Dumas have also proposed that the partial regression56 coefficients from a multiple 
linear regression of firm value on the vector of exchange rates provide operational 
measures of exposure to individual currencies. This means that exposure to the K 
business risk factor can be estimated by regressing stock returns on the returns 
associated with the underlying risks, that is 
55 Exposures are defined as the change in the market value of the firm in response to a change in the 
value of each currency to which the firm is exposed. 
56 Regression means that X variables are fixed or specified by the experimenter before data collection. 
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1<=1 
where RJt is the return on the /h stock and Rkt is the innovation in the k!" risk factor. 
As is normal practice in other studies, most of the results have been compiled based on 
the correlations57 of two variables whilst the other potential factors are neglected. The 
commonly used model is linear-regression, where both variables are different from one 
replication to another and, thus, sampling error is involved in both variables. To 
minimise possible economic variable bias, the current research includes the industrial 
market return when estimating exposure coefficients. This, however, enables and 
includes the impact of other market influences, such as the effect of macroeconomic 
factors on the individual asset returns. As this procedure significantly improves the 
suitability of the model and reduces the standard errors or the exposure coefficient, 
Bodnar and Wong (2001) have emphasised that it may change the interpretations of the 
coefficient estimate . However, it is important to note that, even if the market itself 
shows non-zero exposure to the risk factors, the zero exposure coefficients may imply 
that the firm's exposure is the same as the market. It does not imply that the firm has 
zero exposure to a certain factor. 
Therefore, in order to enable the usual interpretation while attaining the benefits of 
including the market return, this study only includes the part of the market return that is 
orthogonal to the risks in the analysis. This means that the residuals from regressing the 
market return on the risk factors are used in place of the actual market returns, and the 
double counting effect from other risk factors is eliminated from such an equation. 
57 Correlation describes the situation in which both X andY are random variables. 
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Exposure to risk factors such as the interest rate, currency, and fuel prices are thus 
estimated from the following regression equation: 
where Rjt.t+T is the excess return on the individual airline; aj is the level of significance 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 0; ~jt is the standard regression coefficients of the respective risk 
factors; Rit,t+T is the change in the long-term interest rate; Rxt.t+T is the change in the 
exchange rate; RFt.t+T is the difference in the fuel price factor; Rmt.t+T is the part where 
the excess national market return is orthogonal to the other risk factors; and e represents 
the residuals from regressing the market return on the risk factors, which replaces the 
actual market returns. Returns are computed as the log of the price/rate relative over the 
interval from t to T, where T equals 1, 2, 4, 13, 52, and 156 weeks. To assess whether 
the exposures are jointly significant, robust Wald X} test statistics are computed with 
Statistica. These test the null hypothesis that Pj1 =Pjx =PjF = 0. 
Studies by J orion ( 1990) and Loudon (2004) provide evidence of foreign exchange 
exposure using monthly return intervals, but indicate a lower than expected incidence 
of statistically significant exposure. This result coincides with "the exposure puzzle58" 
cited in the literature. However Chow, Lee, and Solt (1997) argued that, since the 
58 Based on basic fmancial models and reports in the business press, exchange rate movements are 
generally believed to affect the value of non-financial firms. In contrast, empirical research on 
non-fmancial firms typically produces fewer significant exposure estimates than researchers expect, 
independent of the sample and methodology used. 
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long-term effects of current exchange rate changes are difficult to evaluate and are 
progressively exposed through time, long horizon returns may be more informative 
about the true degree of exposure. Similar currency trends were discovered in the study 
of Di Iorio and Faff (200 1) based on Australian industries. Since it is probable that 
forecasting the long-term effects of interest rate and fuel price changes will present 
likely trends as the xchange rate changes, a similar effect is expected to apply for these 
risks in the current study. In the current paper, several multi-week horizons, as 
mentioned above, stretching out to three years, are used to examine the horizon issue. 
In order to implement a multi-week horizon analysis, this study measures the 
multi-week return at the end of each week by using all available past weekly returns up 
to the indicated horizon length. This maximises the usage of the sample information but 
may create the problem of serial correlation, as the returns are overlapped with an 
increasing horizon length. This problem is adjusted for by using the method of Newey 
and West (1987) with standard efforts for serial correlation, which is also robust to 
heteroscedasticity59. 
4.3.2 Non-linear risk exposures 
After examining risk exposures using linear methods, this study tests the significance of 
the risk exposures employing non-linear methods, because the exposures may be 
non-linear to the company. The asymmetries in exposure may be caused either by the 
59 Heteroscedastic desc "bes a data sample or data-generating process in which the errors are drawn from 
different distributions for different values of the independent variables 
(economics.about.com/cs/econornicsglossary/g/heteroskedastic.htm). 
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underlying exposure itself if it is non-linear, or the hedging activities of the company, 
which induce the non-linearity of the exposure risk as the selective hedging methods, or 
the usage of asymmetric hedging instruments by the company, have an impact on the 
significance of the exposures themselves. A study by Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter 
(2001) supports the non-linearity risk exposure statement, as the company may 
selectively hedge, and the hedging strategy varies through time in response to changing 
market conditions. Generally speaking, airline accounting management policy states 
that derivatives are not used for speculative trading purposes, but as a tool of financial 
risk management. Somehow, if the hedging is not completed but contains discretionary 
elements, the distinction between hedging and speculating becomes unclear.60 
Di Lorio and Faff (2 00) introduced the method of options hedging motives, which 
may induce the possible non-linear exposure inclusively in the asymmetric format for 
the currency exposure regressions. This study was conducted within the Australian 
industry, with the fi dings compiled across industries and data frequencies. Similar 
evidence has been found for the interest rate regression in a sample of non-financial 
German firms (Bartram, 2002). 
Therefore, to investigate whether exposures have non-linear characteristics, this 
research distinguishes between exposure during times of positive, negative, and neutral 
(i.e. small) changes in non-market risk factors. To do so, we extend equation (1) to 
J 3 3 
Rr = a + LJ3qJ DqJrRn + LJ3q..r Dq.rr R.rr + zj3qFDqFTRFT + fJ,. R, r + cr (2) 
q~ q~ q~ 
60 Both SAA and Comair state in their accounting policies that the effective portion of the gain or loss 
derived from the hedging policy is recognised immediately in equity, whereas the ineffective portions are 
brought over to the income statement. 
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where DqkT are dummy variables set equal to one when the Kh factor innovation is 
either zero, neutral (q=1), positive (q=2), or negative (q=3). Innovations are classified 
as neutral for a particular risk factor if the figure falls within plus or minus half the 
standard deviation of all sample innovations. Positive or negative innovations are those 
falling outside of this range in either direction. All other variables are the same as for 
equation (1). To simplify notation, as in Loudon's (2004) study, this calculation 
excludes the firm subscript in equation (2) and uses the time subscript T as shorthand 
for the variable length time horizon from t toT. As above, when estimating linear 
exposure, Twill be equal to 1, 2, 4, 13, 52, or 156 weeks. Multiple horizons are used to 
assess whether the asymmetric exposure is horizon-specific. 
The current study will also use the Wald test to determine whether significant 
asymmetric exposure exists for each risk factor. The test of the null hypothesis is for the 
K'" risk factor, ~ 1 k=~2k=~3k . Similar to the linear risk exposure calculations in order to 
measure the estimate on the overlapping returns from multi-weeks, heteroscedastic auto 
correlation, which consists of standard errors, is used to assess the significance of the 
exposure coefficient . 
This chapter present basic characteristics as well as the financial and operational data 
of SAA and Com air. To present a broader view of the global aviation industry for 
comparison with our study subjects, data from other international global airline 
companies are also used. The technical analysis presents perspectives from the balance 
sheet and statistical results to provide more complete information on, and investigation 
of, the airlines. After defining the formulae of this research, we present the results 
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obtained directly from utilizing the equations mentioned in Chapter 5. A brief 
comparison of the results of this study and those of our reference study- Loudon (2004) 
- is presented to provide a better understanding of the performance of SAA and Comair. 
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Chapter 5. Results and Analysis 
Financial variables are under the influence of unpredictable fluctuations in the market, 
which leads academic researchers to produce varying analytical results, even when 
identical formulae are deployed. As the study results vary in different scenarios, the 
outcome of the current research may deviate from that of Loudon (2004). It is possible 
for SAA, one of our research subjects, to show results which may be incomparable with 
other studies, as this airline presents an exceptionally poor equity structure in the 
financial reports during the study period. 
The analyses in this tudy include calculating performance measures in both linear and 
non-linear expressio s. It is also interesting to notice that, later in this chapter, the effect 
of a movement in one financial risk factor has a different result when the measurement 
method changes. For instance, interest exposure shows different degree of significant 
influences on the returns ofComair when implementing linear and non-linear 
expressions respectively. 
5.1 Linear risk exposures 
The linear exposure coefficients of the interest rate, currency, and fuel price risk for 
both airlines are detailed in Table 6 below. The figures extracted are beta coefficients, 
using equation (1) with the corresponding selected multi-week horizons of 1, 2, 4, 52, 
and 156 weeks. Results are produced by Statistica based on the linear regression 
equation in order to obtain exposure coefficients for interest rate, currency, and fuel 
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price risk. Rows labelled "Wald" contain robust X2 statistics from the Wald test of the 
null hypothesis, which assumes that the joint effect of the fuel, currency, and interest 
rate coefficients in equation (1) is equal to zero. 
Academically, there are several statistical methods available to determine the 
relationships between the variables as well as the level of significance. These methods 
include, for example, multi-linear methods, ANOVA, and MANOVA61 • In order to 
facilitate comparison with Loudon's (2004) study, only the coefficients, Wald test62, and 
adjusted R 2 are reported, whilst the intercepts and market betas are neglected in this 
study. 
Table 6 below presents mixed results with different levels of significance, where p 
equals 0.10, 0.05, a d 0.01, respectively. Table 6 shows that interest rate exposure 
impacts SAA negatively across the short- and long-term horizons. This means that 
airlines performances are influenced negatively by the changes of the rates in the 
decision-making process of both short- and long- term time scales. Interestingly, 
Loudon (2004) made a similar assumption, expecting a negative and significant impact 
of interest rate expo ure for Qantas and Air New Zealand, but the outcome was positive. 
The results for SAA demonstrate a significant influence as a combined effect oflosses 
in market value and the interest-free loan from Transnet. Therefore, the estimation of 
61 ANOVA and MANOVA are used to conduct an analysis of the variance of factorial designs with or 
without repeated measures. Both modules are included in general linear models, which includes both 
linear and non-linear measurement. 
62 The Wald Test is a te t of significance of the regression coefficient. It is based on the asymptotic 
normality property of maximum likelihood estimates, and is computed as: W = b * I N ar(b) * b. 
The test is based on the behaviour of the log-likelihood function at the point where the respective 
parameter estimate is equal to 0.0 (zero); specifically, it uses the derivative (slope) of the log-likelihood 
function evaluated at the null hypothesis value of the parameter (parameter = 0. 0). 
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the impact of net losses on the financial statements of SAA is expected to further 
influence the remaining financial factors. 
Table 6 Linear ris exposures 
Horizon in Weeks 1 2 4 13 52 
Panel A: SAA 
Interest rate exposure -0.6096 # -0.6096 # -0.6096 # -0.6096 # -0.4726 # 
Currency exposure -0.6583 # -0.6583 # -0.6583 # -0.6583 # -0.4620 # 
Fuel price exposure 0.4645 # 0.4645 # 0.4645 # 0.4645 # 0.2519 
Wald 0.0634 3.6661 * 0.0529 25.5491 0.1094 
Adjusted R2 0.5692 0.5692 0. 5692 0.5692 0.31096 
Panel B: Comair 
Interest rate exposure -0.2359**,* -0.2359**' * -0.2135**,* -0.1747* -0.063 1 
Currency exposure -0.6542# -0.6542# -0.6536# -0.6018# -0.4455# 
Fuel price exposure 0. 1471 0.1487 0.1686 0.189 1 0.1852**, * 
Wald 2.6381 0.0725 6.9820# 25.0128# 184.9254# 
Adjusted R2 0.49874 0.49874 0.48246 0.68324 0.7012 
Note: ***,**and* shows the coeffic1ent IS s1gmficant at e1ther the levels of 0.0 I, 0.05, and 0.1 0, respectively. 












Currency exposure coefficients show a passive correlation in Table 6 with negative 
values across our study periods with the exclusion of the 156 week horizon. The effect 
of currency exposures on SAA and Comair becomes less significant as the time horizon 
increases. Currency exposure is only significant for the returns of SAA at the 5% and 
10% levels, and there is no significance for Comair in Week 156. Compared to 
Loudon's (2004) findings, presented in Appendix 8, all currency exposure coefficients 
are significantly different from zero, except for the finding at the 52 week horizon of 
Qantas, which is only marginally significant at the 10% level. 
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In general, there appears to be the existence of a positive and significant effect of fuel 
price exposure on SAA, with the exclusion of Week 156, where the coefficient is 
negative. No significant influence is found in the Week 52 horizon. In Loudon (2004)'s 
study, there is evidence of a significant impact of exposure to fuel price risk of Qantas. 
As the example airline from Loudon's study (2004) demonstrates a negative coefficient 
of fuel exposure at all horizons, only the results from the 2, 52, and 156 weeks are 
significant at either the 5% or 10% level. 
On the other hand, Comair had positive returns on the financial statements, with the 
movement of coefficients deviating more than the results of SAA. This is because the 
relevancies or significances become uncertain compared to SAA. Therefore, the 
analysis becomes crucial, as it indicates the directions of factor significance. The results 
are also more presentable in reflecting the exposure influence effect on local airlines, 
which present the direct effect from the local economy. 
The results listed in Table 6 show that Comair had a negative coefficient for interest 
rate exposure over the market returns, and the variable is significant at the 5% and 10% 
levels across the short-term, at Weeks 1, 2, 4, and 13 . However, there is no influence at 
the 52 week horizon. The results also show a negative and significant result of interest 
rate exposure over the long-term frame, indicating that the airline is vulnerable to 
long-term interest exposure. 
Simultaneously, both SAA and Comair showed negative exposure to exchange rate 
risks, except that there are no findings at the 156 week horizon. This is because the 
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exposure was not significant for Comair at any level. This result was in opposition to 
· our-reference study, but matched their initial prediction. 
Evidence from the analysis in Table 6 demonstrates that the fuel exposure is less 
significant for Comair in comparison to SAA, as for the most part the results showed 
positive coefficients without significant correlations for Comair. Concurrently, the 
results of the fuel coefficients were positive for Comair, except in Week 156. The 
variable is also significant at levels of 5% and 10%, but a figure of 10% is also present 
for the Week 156 horizon. 
The result of the airline was in contradiction to our estimation, as well as the estimation 
derived from the study by Loudon (2004). The difference in our results compared to 
those of our reference study may be caused by the direct calculation of fuel prices in 
local currency instead of analysing it in USD. This conversion of fuel cost leads to a 
deviation in the result. This is not to state that currency exposure influences only one 
factor, as it influences others indirectly and presents the combined exposure effect on 
airline returns. 
In addition to investigating the coefficients from the airlines and the different levels of 
significance, it is crucial for us to compare the results based on horizon. Merely 
considering the coeffi cients and significances at all three probability levels leads the 
results to present slightly more significant exposure over the short-term than long-term 
horizons. Short-term horizons are defined from Week 1 to 13, whilst long-term horizons 
are from Week 53 to 156. For example, sixteen out of twenty-four coefficient 
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observations are significant for the 1, 2, 4, and 13 week returns, whereas seven out of 
twelve coefficient observations are significant for the 52 and 156 week horizons. 
This result is opposite of Loudon's (2004), who found that the exposures are more 
significant over the 1 nger term. Our results show a small standard deviation of 66% for 
the short-term horiz nand 58% for the long-term horizon. After a detailed breakdown, 
the analysis illustrat s one of the reasons why this study shows contradicting results to 
our reference sample. Financial risk exposure has a 100% influence on the market value 
of SAA, which raises the weight proportion of significances in the short-term horizons 
across the two airlines. 
In addition to this, the horizon effect may have reflected greater true exposure or simply 
measurement error from the raw data due to the diversification of the usage of directive 
data throughout time. 
Results from the Wald tests of joint exposures on interest rates, exchange currency, and 
fuel prices are largely inconsistent with the above-mentioned discussion, especially for 
SAA. The result for SAA shows a non-significant Wald test except in Week 2, albeit at 
the 10% level only. 
An average Wald test also shows a positive coefficient for the total effect on the airline 
returns. This shows that the returns are moving in the same direction as the total risk 
factors. On the other hand, more significance is found in the Wald test for Comair 
compared to SAA. The airline shows a consistent result with joint significances in 
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Weeks 4, 13, and 52. It is obvious that, as the time horizon extends, the coefficient for 
Comair increases. The coefficient was 2.4 times at Week 1 and moved to 283.24 times 
in the long-term ho ·zon in Week 156. In Loudon's (2004) study, the Wald test shows 
that joint significance is largely consistent with the exposures. While none of the 
exposure coefficients is significant for Air New Zealand using the 2 week returns, the 
Wald test suggests joint significance, albeit at the 10% level only. 
Generally speaking, the linear expression indicates that the explanatory power tends to 
increase with horizon length for Comair, especially for the longest horizons. As such, 
the findings for adjusted R 2 show no difference for the Week 1 and 2 results for the 
individual airlines. This is due to the fact that the data are comparable and the time 
horizons are nearly identical within such a short-term period. However, SAA shows a 
decrease from 56.92% to 31.01% and then another increase to 58.17% in the long-term 
horizon. Within the study duration, Comair displays from 49.87% to a highest of 
70.12% in Week 52. This is followed by a decline to 48.93% at Week 156 as the next 
tier. 
5.2 Non-linear risk exposures 
The results from Table 7 below summarise the exposure coefficients for interest rate, 
exchange currency, and fuel price risks as estimated from non-linear regression 
equation (2) for selected multi-week horizons. To follow Loudon's (2004) methodology, 
intercepts of the equation, global market betas, and robust standard errors are omitted in 
the current study. The statistical tool used is the multiple regression method from 
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Statistica. Neutral is exposure to risk factor innovations within plus or minus half the 
standard deviation of the sample innovation. Positive or negative refers to innovation 
outside of this range. Wald test statistics of the null hypothesis are also reported. The 
Wald formula contains robust X2 statistics, which show that the coefficients related to 
neutral, positive, and negative innovations for the relevant risk factor are jointly equal. 
Table 7 Non-Line r Risk Exposures 
Horizon in weeks 1 2 4 13 52 156 
Panel A: SAA 
Interest Rate Expos re 
!Neutral -0.2976# -0.2976# -0.2927# -0.2862# -0.1453# -0.1943# 
Positive -0.1488# -0.1488# -0.1463# -0.1431# -0.0726# -0.0971 # 
Negative -0.0992# -0 .0992# -0.0976# -0.0954# -0.0484# -0.0648# 
Wald 0.0030 0.0030 0.0023 0.0008 0.0065 1.4071 
Currency Exposure 
Neutral -0.4783# -0.4783# -0.4834# -0.4941 # -0.4421 # -0.6206# 
Positive -0.2391 # -0.2391 # -0.2417# -0.2470# -0.2211 # -0.3103# 
Negative -0.1594# -0.1594# -0.1611 # -0.1647# -0.1474# -0.2069# 
Wald 0.1012 0.1012 0.1006 0.0985 0.0932 0.4422 
Fuel Price Exposure 
!Neutral -0.0116# -0.0116# -0.01013# -0.0105# -0.0059# -0.0024# 
Positive -0.0062# -0.0062# -0.0058# -0.0052# -0.0029# -0.0012# 
!Negative -0.00342# -0.0042# -0.0039# -0.0036# -0.0021 # -0.0009# 
Wald 0.0520 0.0520 0.0423 0.0349 0.0527 0.9168 
!Adjust R2 0.7726 0.7726 0.7731 0.7792 0.7121 0.7070 
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Horizon in weeks 1 2 4 13 52 156 
Panel B: Comair 
Interest Rate Expos re 
Neutral -0.0174# -0.0174# -0.0161# -0.0153 -0.0075 -0.0261 # 
Positive -0.0087# -0.0087# -0.0081# -0.0076 0.0004# -0.0130# 
Negative -0.0058# -0.0058# -0.0054# -0.0051 0.0003# -0.0087# 
Wald 2.0489 2.0489 1.8153 1.9452 0.0891 10.0405# 
Currency Exposure 
Neutral -0.0734# -0.0734# -0.0748# -0.0799# -0.0810# 0.0051 
Positive -0.0367# -0.0367# -0.0374# -0.0399# -0.0405# 0.0025 
Negative -0.0245# -0.0245# -0.0249# -0.0266# -0.0270# 0.0017 
Wald 59.1175# 59 .1175# 62.6710# 73.8910# 67.5470# 0.8594 
Fuel Price Exposure 
Neutral 0.00012 0.00012 0.0009 0.00010 0.00015* -0.0023# 
Positive 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0031 -0.00 12# 
Negative 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0017 -0.00010# 
Wald 4.1289**,* 4.1289**,* 4.9231 **,* 5.8087**,* 13.2682# 57.3572# 
Adjust R2 0.3798 0.3798 0.3986 0.5352 0.6612 0.4665 
Note: ***, **, and * show that the coeffictent 1s stgmficant at a level of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
#shows that the coefficient is significant at all levels: 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. 
The findings of our research are similar to those of Loudon (2004), presented in 
Appendix 9. The Wald tests suggest that non-linearity is important for long-term 
horizon returns, though the findings in the shorter-term rarely exist. For the short-term 
findings, only four of the twenty-four Wald tests conducted for the horizons up to Week 
13 are significant. T e results for SAA show that the positive coefficient for joint 
exposures has no significant effect on the market returns. For the 52 and 156 week 
horizon lengths, four out of twelve observations ofWald tests are significant. These 
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findings mainly occur under Comair's section. On the other hand, no significance is 
found for SAA in any category. Loudon's (2004) research shows that, for the 52 and 
156 week horizon lengths, all Wald tests are significantly different from zero at 5% or 
better, except the interest rate exposure for Qantas, which is not significant at any 
reasonable level. Therefore, only 24 Wald tests conducted for horizons up to 13 weeks 
are significant. 
In contrast to the zero results for the measurement for SAA in the study, Comair shows 
a positive and significant coefficient for exchange exposures at all p levels except at 
Week 156. Under interest rate exposure, Week 156 responds with a positive, significant 
value. For fuel price exposure, the Wald test shows positive significance at levels of 5% 
and 10% across the short-term frames. In addition, significance at the 1% level for 
long-term horizons has also been discovered. It is notable that the significant coefficient 
shows a large probability value, as the result compares to the non-significant exposures. 
In contrast, SAA shows no significance in any exposure at any reasonable level. 
Comparing the adjusted R2 between the linear and non-linear specifications, the 
movements demonstrate similar patterns to each other. The movement shows marginal 
increases in explanatory power for the horizons up to 13 weeks and a clear change 
when the time horizon expands. This is especially true for Weeks 52 and 156. It is also 
notable that Comair has identical adjusted R2 figures in both the linear and non-linear 
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expressions63 . 
Inspecting the coefficients in Table 6 individually shows that the most significant 
exposures are revealed in the two longest time horizons. Out of 72 coefficient 
exposures for horizons up to 13 weeks, 57 observations, or 79%, are significant. 
Comparatively, 29 o t of 36 coefficients (81%) based on the 52 and 156 week returns 
are more significant. Although the differences in between are not tremendous, the 
findings show that n n-linearity is more influential in the longer term. These results 
correspond to Loudon's (2004) finding, as of the 72 exposure coefficients for horizons 
up to Week 13, only 15 observations are significant in his finding. In the long-term 
horizon, 26 out of 36 coefficients are significant. This percentage of deviation is similar 
to ours. 
In the current analysis, we obtained different results than those obtained by Loudon 
when comparing the individual coefficients in Tables 6 and 7. Our results express 
several figures where the non-linear exposure coefficient is indistinguishable from zero 
and non-significant in Table 7, yet significant exposure does exist for part of the range 
of innovations in th risk factor at linear expression. 
Such cases of asymmetric responses are not restricted to any time horizon. Examples in 
our findings include fuel price exposure for Comair in Week 52, where the figure is 
found to be significant with a value of 0.1852 in the linear table but is non-significant 
63 Adjusted R2 is used in multiple regression models to choose the best subset of predictor effects. The 
formula is calculated as one minus the ratio of the mean square residual over the mean square total. In 
this case, nothing much differs from the linear and non-linear data; therefore, the figures also change 
proportionally, leading to similar findings in Tables 2 and 3. 
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with a figure indistinguishable from zero in positive (-0.0031) and negative movements 
(- 0.0017) in the non-linear expression. 
Loudon (2004) suggests that, in order to determine the extent to which exposure to 
these three risks either improves or lowers returns, one needs to verify how often 
significant exposures move in favourable directions (Loudon, 2004). Derived from 
equation (2), Tables 6 and 7 show that the optimal results are those which are positively 
correlated with the coefficients. Returns are higher if positive exposure to a given risk 
exists during positive changes in the underlying price, or negative exposure occurs 
when negative price changes are found. 
Table 6 shows the combination of exposures occurring in individual cases, with fuel 
combined with currency exposure for Comair in the 52 week horizon, though the 
movement range is small for Comair. These findings do not show a systematic pattern 
in regards to the movement of returns as expected. The opposite effect, which is the 
negative impact on returns, occurs in our findings as well. The opposite effect, with a 
negative impact on returns, occurs in SAA's categories. Significant negatives are found 
when the factor innovations are positive in interest and currency exposures. Similarly, 
this combination of exposures is found in Loudon (2004)'s case, with currency 
exposure for Air New Zealand at the 52 week horizon. For Qantas at the 52 week 
horizon, both currency and fuel price exposures are significantly negative when factor 
innovations are positive, and vice versa. 
The current chapter details the statistical findings of significant effects of the combined 
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financial risk exposure impact on SAA and Comair. Linear and non-linear equations 
enable us to compare the significant levels of our study objects against other 
international airlines. The coefficients show that our study objects are exposed to 
similar degrees of risk factors compared to other international airlines. Certain exposure 
has the same sign as Loudon's (2004) study, which implies that the same risk factor 
impacts the airline returns in similar degrees. 
Chapter 5 serves the purpose of delivering the analytical findings of the financial 
impact of the risk factors on airline returns. In conjunction with Chapter 4, this study 
provides a detailed financial overview of SAA and Comair and provides an overview of 
the degree of impact of certain exposures. In Chapter 6, a review of summary will be 
presented to provide a complete picture of the current research findings. 
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Chapter 6. Summary 
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Chapter 6. Summary 
The aim of this study is to investigate the financial impact of selected financial risk 
exposures on the returns of the airlines under consideration, focusing on an 
investigation of the correlations of South African-oriented companies with their related 
economic factors. The reference model we use is that of Loudon (2004), which 
included a comparison of the linear (market returns against all risk factors) and 
non-linear risk (exposure is non-linear itself or derives from the hedging activities) 
equations. Loudon (2004) used this analysis technique and equation to investigate New 
Zealand Airways, from New Zealand, and Qantas, from Australia. In order to simulate 
the study by Loudon, the current research replicated the core analysis method and 
equations, which were simultaneously applied to two South African-based airlines: 
South African Airways (SAA) and Comair. 
A basic historical background is presented for both airlines at the beginning of the 
analysis in Chapter 2. Both SAA and Comair apply accounting policies in accordance 
with South African Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice ("GAAP"). 
As most of SAA's financial transactions are US dollar-denominated, the strengthening 
of the Rand, as accounted for under SAA's current accounting policies, negatively and 
significantly influences the operating profit. 
The current study includes the comparison of SAA's total return to the shareholders to 
the returns on S&P figures. The S&P figures show a lesser increase than SAA for the 
period after late 2001, which can be presumed to be, in part, due to the effect of 
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September 11 , 2001. Although there were no serious influences on the performance of 
South African airlines following the terrorist attacks in September 2001 , the attacks 
affected the returns of global airlines in general. As a result, SAA showed an unbeatable 
increase in its returns. Of particular importance is the fact that SAA has access to funds 
on an annual basis i order to strengthen the response to the risks faced. 
SAA's operating costs are mainly composed of fuel costs, research and development 
expenditures, labour, maintenance material costs, outsourcing ofiT support, in-flight 
entertainment costs, and lease agreements on the aircrafts. 
Some of the major challenges SAA faces include fluctuating exchange rates, labour 
problems, the cost of leasing aircraft, cost of expanding networks, ever-increasing fuel 
costs, and intense competition in the market. 
Comair, which faces similar risks, has struggled in terms of stiff competition in the 
market. The risks of the financial factors are managed in various ways. For example, 
interest rate factors are managed by fixing the rate on long-term loans and investing 
surplus funds with market return yields. Foreign currency risk is managed through 
forward exchange contracts. 
In addition, a brief introduction of the relevant variables, which includes airline returns 
and financial risk factors, is presented. Relevant literature reviews, which were focused 
on risk exposure analysis, were conducted and summarised in Chapter 3 of the current 
paper. 
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Researchers have investigated various determinants of exposure along with the hedging 
policies to mitigate exposure, and have shown that the airline sector is one in which 
corporate hedging could add value by addressing under-investment problems. The 
major risk exposure factors are the interest rate, the currency factor and fuel costs. It 
has been suggested that companies implement corporate risk management by 
modifying their operations, adjusting their capital structure, and using targeted financial 
instruments. 
Interest rate risk is important, as the interest rate is applied in debt finance and affects 
the liquidity of the company, while borrowing costs are directly related to interest rate 
changes. Interest rates have significant influence on the general economic conditions 
and the progression of the business cycle, with consequential effect on consumer 
demand, especially when demand is cyclical and seasonal, and contains a large tentative 
component. Higher interest rates may increase expected costs of distress, particularly 
for the airline industry where leverage is high and distress costs are substantial. 
Researchers have pointed out how the economic structure helps to determine the 
exposure effect of exchange rates on firms. Studies have also demonstrated that net 
foreign revenues are the main component of a firm's exchange rate exposure. Several 
studies have confirmed the influence of currency on the airlines, and have shown that 
foreign activity is significantly related to exchange rate exposure. 
Fuel price management is a major factor in financial control of airlines, as jet fuel costs 
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comprise a significant portion of airline operation costs, at up to 13%. It has been 
suggested that short-term cash flows could be directly related to changes in fuel prices 
due to price change inertia. Competition prevents airlines from simply adjusting their 
fare schedules or seat capacity to compensate for increases in fuel prices. Jet fuel prices 
may be hedged, which is important considering that airline profitability is reduced by 
the direct and indirect costs associated with fuel prices. 
Studies show that airlines increase value by hedging their jet fuel price exposures. 
Hedging also allows airlines to fund investment during periods of high jet fuel prices. 
Hedging on jet fuel prices is effective since this particular exposure is more volatile 
than prices of other underlying assets, particularly currencies. 
A description of the data collection methods and data collected for the variables is 
presented in Chapter 4 as well as in the figures and appendix, along with an explanation 
of the highlights and exceptional increases or declines of the trends during the study 
period. The data were analysed using three methods: financial and operational analysis 
of the airlines ' characteristics, linear risk exposure measurements and non-linear risk 
exposure measurements. 
Figure 6 and 7 contain basic graphs of the airline returns, allowing us to compare this 
performance during specific time periods. The study reveals that both airlines had a low 
return on investment performance from 2001 to 2003. This trend, however, corresponds 
to the trend evident in the performance of the global airlines. On average, 2002 and 
2003 were not well-performing periods for international airlines around the globe. 
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Appendix 3 shows the key variables over the study period, illustrating the patterns of 
risk factors and their impact on the returns, as well as the likely gains for the airlines 
from managing thes risks effectively. 
It is crucial to consider the trends evident in the individual risk factors or exposure 
variables during our study period, as their movements influence airline returns. As 
reflected in Appendix 3, the South African interest rate shows a decrease in the 
long-term horizons, but a sudden rise from mid-2002 to mid-2003. An increase in the 
interest rate corresp nds with a period when the economy was going through a 
recession before growth was experienced in 2004 and 2005. The currency factor shows 
unstable fluctuation, which negatively impacts the airlines' financial performances, 
especially where there are certain transactions in foreign currency, such as foreign sales, 
overseas expenditures, and overseas airport stop-by and management fees. There is also 
a constant increase in the price of Brent crude oil and jet kerosene, as a commodity, 
especially after the terrorist attacks and declaration of the 'war on terror'. All increases 
in expenses and the depreciation of the currencies would only lead the companies into a 
future predicament, as far as return on investment is concerned, if the risk hedging 
instrument were insufficiently manipulated. 
The analysis detailed in Chapter 4 commences with a comparison of the characteristics 
of the airlines, including: foreign sales, fuel cost, gearing, off gearing, interest cover, 
long-term liability, and revenue seat factor. Major airline characteristics have been 
calculated by following the example from Loudon's (2004) study. 
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A summary of the airlines' characteristics reflects the operational performance resulting 
from the company strategy. The figure shows that Comair was less involved in 
international operations, so its foreign sales figures are less than those of SAA. This, 
however, means that Comair is significantly less exposed to the currency risk factor in 
terms of converting foreign sales to local currency. Foreign sales in 2004 constituted 
59% of the total sales of SAA. This figure contributes to the positive return on 
investment for the airline, provided that there was little fluctuation in the currency 
exchange at the time. The effect extended to the results for 2005. It is interesting that, 
although 2002 shows a large percentage of foreign sales, this was also the year in which 
currency exposure showed tremendous fluctuation and caused a remarkable amount of 
deprecation in the South African Rand. The combination of results thus brings the 
return on investment for SAA in 2002 to a serious loss, despite the increase in turnover. 
An analysis of the impact of fuel costs reflects certain operational decisions made by 
the airlines. Comair hows a gradual increase in fuel cost during our study period, 
which corresponds with the decision they made to purchase a number of jets during the 
data collection period. The increased portion for fuel for both SAA and Comair reflects 
the increase in the number of jets, as well as the increase in fuel prices in both local and 
foreign currencies, using USD as the primary conversion currency. Therefore, the 
analysis of fuel cost reflects a combined effect of fuel and currency risk factors on the 
performance ofthe airlines. 
Gearing includes off-balance sheet debt, interest cover, and long-term debts. Gearing is 
considered to be part of the interest rate factor-related analysis. A huge increase in 
104 
gearing, including the off-balance sheet ratio, is found from 2004 to 2005 as the result 
of a convertible loan made to SAA by Transnet, which could be viewed as equity. The 
risk-free interest rate enables SAA to cover its interest payable to the debtors, where the 
interest cover figure shows an increase in 2005. As a result, SAA has high long-term 
debt in the same year. As Comair did not receive a large loan from a third party, its 
interest-related analysis shows a lower ratio and lesser degree of changes compared to 
SAA. Comair made no long-term debt at the beginning, so its interest cover value was 
high and gearing was low due to the fact that the net debt is low, in regards to the ratio, 
compared to the equity values. 
Unfortunately, revenue seat factors were not exposed and published in Comair's 
financial statement, but the result for SAA is rather similar to Loudon's findings for 
both Air New Zealand and Qantas. The figure from Table 1 shows that SAA is still well 
managed in terms of its sales and seat occupancies, because the percentage of revenue 
passenger kilometres to available seat kilometres is rather high compared to other 
international airlines, such as Air New Zealand and Qantas. 
The result of the investigation of these characteristics reflects a financial ratio analysis 
for both airlines, which enables us to understand the aggregate overall performance 
deriving from the daily operations. The figures for the financial and operational ratios 
are shown in relation to the airlines' strategic decision-making. However, the results 
present the few soundly valid ratios, which are not necessarily derived from the most 
outstanding decision-making or performance but rather from the temporary 
environmental bubble support. Although the short-term figure may reflect a striking 
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figure, in the long run, the issue still requires attention, as the origin of the problem still 
exists. After the rati analysis, correlations of the airline returns and risk exposures 
from the data (based on statistical breakdown) are calculated in both linear and 
non-linear manners. 
In order to analyse the close way to Loudon's study (2004), we used a multi-factor 
analysis equation in tead of a single-market factor, which many other researchers have 
used in the past. Also, to eliminate possible research bias from the collection of data as 
well as the possible corruption of data, we used both linear and non-linear methods to 
obtain a comparative result. It is clear that the financial risk exposures of the two 
dominant airlines in South Africa- SAA and Comair- reflect distinctive findings in 
both the linear and non-linear specifications. Using both general linearity methods, we 
identified the return significances on the exposures for interest rate, currency, and fuel 
price risk over a variety ofhorizon lengths, which were calculated from July 1998 to 
December 2005. 
The analysis of our findings, as detailed in Chapter 5, shows that the returns of SAA are 
influenced by the financial risk factors included in the current study, which are 
significant over most of the return values. As SAA shows financial losses during our 
period of study, any values on the risk factor would result in an impact on the linear or 
non-linear inequality, as the result always leads to negative values on the total of the 
equation. However, there are exceptions which show no significant influence on the 
risk factors. The horizon may average out the exponential power of the equation, 
leading to a certain probability level, but not significance. For example, the linear risk 
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exposure of SAA shows that fuel price exposure does not have a significant influence 
on the 52nd week horizon. Conversely, Comair shows a significant influence over the 
same time horizon whilst other fuel exposures show no impact on the airline returns. 
During that period, jet kerosene shows a small price decrease, which had no significant 
effect on SAA, but had a positive and significant effect on the returns of Comair. 
We also investigated the fact that currency exposure has negative significance during 
most of the study horizons. The only exception is Week 156 for Comair, which shows 
no influence during the long-term period. The currency impact on airline returns tends 
to average out when the time horizon is extended. In addition, the currency depreciated 
at the end of our research data collection period; therefore, the impact of such a factor is 
less for our target study airlines. Table 6 shows that SAA is less significantly affected 
by the currency exposure in Week 156, as the coefficient is significant only at levels of 
0.05 and 0.1 0, whereas other time horizons are negative and significant across the three 
levels of probabiliti s. The impact of currency exposure also holds for the returns of 
Comair, with no impact whatsoever on Week 156. 
Loudon (2004) conducted an investigation into the events of September 2001 , and the 
results showed that the events had little discernible effect upon on the exposures we 
focus in this study. Although this study did not include a comparison of this 
extraordinary event s an investigation into the consistency of exposure pre-and 
post -September 200 l, the raw data of the exposures did not show deviating figures 
during the same period. This means that no fluctuation pattern was found pre- and 
post-September 2001 in the raw data or variables. Loudon (2004) concluded that 
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stronger evidence has been discovered for exposures when overlapping returns are 
employed. In other words, from the observations in the pre- and post-periods of 
September 2001, none of the multi-week horizon exposures were significant using 
non-overlapping returns, whereas 33 per cent of the exposures were significant using 
overlapping data for the full sample. Thus, should current study conduct similar 
investigations in the same manner, the results are predicted to be similar to the 
outcomes in Tables 6 and 7. 
Certain scenarios correspond with Loudon's findings while others are different. In brief, 
these scenarios are discussed below. 
1. As one of the most distinctive findings in this study, the returns of SAA 64 are 
significantly affected by all exposures over all time horizons with the 
exception of fuel exposure in Week 52. This corresponds with the initial 
estimation, as SAA showed losses during the financial period of 1998 to 2005, 
which reflects that all exposures influence the negative returns, and vice versa. 
This indicates that all risk factors significantly influenced financial 
performance to a certain degree, especially when losses, rather than profits, 
are shown. 
2. Loudon (2004)'s finding states that the short-term returns ofQantas and Air 
New Zealand are both negatively impacted by the fuel exposure. The returns 
64 SAA returns are calculated by obtained annual return on investment and average out to become daily 
data. Daily data then processed into different study period of 1, 2, 4, 13 and 156 week's result which 
enables the calculation of the correlations with the risk exposures. 
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for Comair are significantly exposed to fuel price in the short-term, which 
corresponds with Loudon's findings. However, the exposure is not significant 
in non-linear models, which becomes prevailing as the horizon length is 
extended. 
3. Adding asymmetric terms does not tend to increase the incidence of 
significant exposure at the short horizon lengths. Conversely, evidence of 
non-linearity is slightly stronger for long-term horizon returns. Whereas the 
non-linearity is found to be significant, it is rare in our case that the sign of 
the exposure points in a direction which enhances returns. 
4. Exposures are more significant over the short-term horizon in the linear 
equation, with an 8% difference compared to the long-term horizons. This is 
slightly m re so over the long-term horizon, with a 1% difference in 
individual cases of the non-linear calculation. 
To summarise the findings, the results of the analysis show that the airlines examined in 
this study are more effective in managing their exposures to financial risks in the 
short-term than in the long-term. In regards to Comair, a financially independent airline 
operator, the result i rather consistent as it is commonly realised that the hedging 
instruments are oflimited help in managing long-term risks. This is reasonable as 
long-term events are more difficult to predict. However, this conclusion may be 
prejudiced, as the short-horizon returns may contain too much noise, such as inflation 
and domestic GDP, when the airline needs to detect true exposure levels. In addition, 
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since even the ultimate methods only allow the observation of exposures after hedging, 
we can only investigate the significance of the risk levels in affecting the airline's return. 
The extent to which the lack of measured exposure reflects effective risk management 
is impossible to determine. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
The South African economy is unique from any other system in the world. This 
uniqueness derives from the gold boom and economic independency at an early stage in 
the country's development (Jammine, A. & Bester, M., 2001). The long-term result of 
this was the transformation of the country's economy to a self-sustained system, which 
is more dominant than the other main financial bodies in the world, for example, the 
European financial system or the United States' economy. However, as with all else, the 
situation presented pros and cons. The independency of the South African economic 
system may mean that the country has not benefited from the global economic boom, 
but on the other hand, it is less vulnerable to global economic threats and impact than 
may be the case for other countries. 
The above statement reflects the scenarios of our study objects. The two airline entities 
show their returns t remain independent of and not influenced by the extraordinary 
global impact made by the event on 11 September 2001. Although the financial 
performances of our study objects are vulnerable to the economic factors, the impact 
and the influences are more severe on the domestic rather than on the international 
scenanos. 
By observing the trend in the financial risk exposures, in addition to the economic 
analysis from the analysts, it shows that the Brent crude oil and jet kerosene price are 
predicted to continue to increase. This is as a result of the decrease of petrol refinery 
production, a decrease in the reserves of the resources, and the fact that fewer new oil 
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mines have been discovered. Unless a substitute resource is discovered for petrol, 
human dependencies on petrol will only make the price increase continually. 
The South African Rand is also expected to depreciate gradually but continuously. This, 
however, stimulates and encourages foreign sales as the airlines can profit from the 
currency fluctuation, excluding the increase of actual foreign sales. But on the other 
hand, SAA has to pay extra travel allowances or overseas personnel expenditures if the 
Rand depreciates. However, if SAA operates its foreign transactions, which are based 
in USD or other currencies, separately before exchanging them in and out of South 
Africa, the swapping mechanism may help to maximise the airline returns to have 
strong currency risk exposures. The ultimate option may be if each country or region is 
capable of operating by themselves in terms of self-sustaining financially, then it can 
minimise the risk from the currency on the returns as well. 
The interest rate variable is a very interesting factor in South African economic system. 
High interest rates discourage people from investing, while also increasing the chances 
of liquidation. The prime rate has been predicted to be increased in the near future, 
following three increases of 0.5 per cent each already this year. This, however, 
negatively impacts airline returns, as the gearings maybe high and may become a huge 
proportion of the expenses account. Especially with SAA, loans occupied a large 
proportion of the liabilities and employee benefit schemes. Thus, an increase in the 
interest rate will cause the airline to offer lesser returns to the shareholders. 
Our study contributes to the results by using a combination of the exposures to 
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investigate the in flu nee on airline returns. In contrast to most of the similar studies, in 
which a single extra-market risk was focused on, this study shows more control for the 
industry effects. In this study, the airlines we examined show results in the short-term, 
which means that the companies are more effectively managing their exposures to 
financial risks in short-term than in the long-term. The result, however, corresponds 
with the usual notion that the using ofhedging instruments is of limited help in 
managing long-term risks, but the effect is more obvious with the short-term exposures. 
The result of this study corresponds to the results from the study of our reference, as 
they found that Air New Zealand and Qantas more effectively manage their exposures 
in short-term than long-term with high significances. 
However, in our study, we have found that the result from the short-term horizon 
returns may contain biased data or other variables, which may influence our analysis 
when considering the true exposure levels. Variables such as inflation, change of 
revenue tax structure, change of companies' financial structure, change of hedging 
instruments used and change of companies' trusts policies will result in so-called noise 
when statistic analy is is used. 
In addition to this, since the data we have obtained is published data which is after-tax 
and hedged, the analysis method we chose in this study was to accommodate such 
processed data. Therefore it is not possible to determine the extent to which a lack of 
measured exposure has showed a greater or lesser reflection of the effectiveness of risk 
management but rather only on the low or high significant underlying risk levels. In 
other words, no specific degree of influence or indication of which specific exposure 
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risk factor would have a specific degree of influence over certain period returns can be 
determined, as the data was analysed and collected on an aggregate basis. This vague 
finding derives from the method this study used which our reference, Loudon, 
discovered in his study, too. Therefore it is recommended that future studies investigate 
those issues, which are beyond the initial scopes of this study. 
In conclusion, the researcher would like to discuss a few critical financial issues for the 
airlines. 
For SAA, although the Transnet Group is financially supporting the company despite 
its financial losses on the statements, it is recommended, as a crucial point, that the 
company restructure its system and aims to become self-sustained as soon as possible. 
As a government-owned airline, it is important for SAA to examine the most critical 
financial risk factors , which can affect both the success of the company and its financial 
performance. 
For Comair, as a JSE-listed company, the more crucial aim is to ensure the public 
shareholders can obtain their returns on the investment at the most optimal levels. By 
doing this, the company cannot avoid the above-mentioned risks for SAA, but at the 
same time, the airline must also be cautious with regard to the public response towards 
the image of the company. In addition, since Comair has an operational agreement with 
British Airways, it is recommend that the airline makes effective use of financial 
instruments such as hedging and forwarding, to avoid significant losses due to the 
currency exposures, which may also cause a negative impact on the local fuel prices. 
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As no company can have full control over the economic risk factors, it becomes crucial 
for companies to choose the correct instrument to manage these risks and to react 
appropriately in the case of extraordinary events, which may cause damage to the 
company. 
The King II publication on corporate governance, created in March 2002, has elevated 
risk management into corporate boardrooms. Risk management must start with a 
management decision regarding what level of risk the business is willing to tolerate in 
line with its strategic goals and objectives. The management of risks is a top 
management responsibility and internal controls must be implemented to effectively 
deal with the risks identified. 
An organisation's greatest asset is its ability to manage the risks it faces and flexibility 
to meet the demands of a changing and competitive environment. Risk management 
should be a strategic priority, allowing a company to respond both reactively and 
proactively to the risks and changes in the market. This means not only managing and 
mitigating the negative aspects of risk, but also the flexibility to take advantage of the 
opportunities that arise when risks are faced in the market. 
Effective risk management supports informed decision-making, reveals the areas in 
which there is a strong potential for adverse impact, identifies risk-based opportunities, 
increases stakeholder confidence, stabilises results by protecting them from 
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disturbances, impro es capital efficiency and reveals opportunities for exploiting 
natural hedges. 
Our study objects would do well to focus on the management of their long-term 
exposures as well as their short-term exposures, so that the companies do not only 
mitigate the risks th y face, but also ensure the company is in a position to take 
advantage of the opportunities these risks often contain. Such an approach is important 
to ensure the long-term sustainability of the company, in an ever-increasingly 
competitive global market. 
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Appendix 1 Net Asset Deployed- Financial Highlight of SAA 
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* Data extracted from the 2005 Board presentation of SAA's annual report 
*Compared to the losses for the previous two years, improvement of asset value increases the value of the shareholders in 2005 . 
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Appendix 2 Airline Average Rates of Return on Capital 
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Appendix 3 Analysis on Financial Risk Variables 
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3.3 Singapore Jet Kerosene Spot FOB (US Dollar per Barrel) 
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Appendix 4 Weekly Closing Price of Individual Global Airline Industry shares 
in US Dollars from 1998 to 2005 
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*Above Weekly Closing Price for the respective Global Individual Airlines are: World Air Holdings (WLDA), North West Airlines 
Corp (NWACQ), Delta Airline (DALRQ), Continental Airlines Class B (CAL), China Southern Airlines Co Ltd (ZNH), China 
Eastern Airlines Corp (CEA), British Airways (BAB), AMR Corp (AMR) and Air France ADS (AKH). 
*Source: McGregor BFA Mweb Database (BFA) 
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Appendix 5 S&P 500 Adjusted Close Index - 1997 to 2006 
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Appendix 6 Weekly Performance of Comair 
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*Source: Johannesburg Stock Exchange Data Service and Computer Share. 
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Appendix 7 Airline characteristics on Qantas and Air New Zealand 
Foreign Sales is the percentage of total revenue derived from geographic regions 
outside the domestic country. Fuel Cost is the cost as a percentage of total operating 
expenditure, excluding depreciation, amortisation and interest. Gearing is the ratio of 
long-term liability to equity. Off gearing is same as Gearing, except that it also includes 
the off balance sheet balance. Interest Cover is earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by net interest expense. Long-term Debt is the ratio of non-current debt to total 
liability, as recorded in the balance sheet. Revenue Seat Factor is the ratio of revenue 
passenger kilometers to the available seat kilometers. 
Fiscal Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Panel A: Qantas 
Foreign Sales 44.3 41.7 41.7 42.1 41.1 45.4 37.7 34.5 
Fuel Cost 11.8 13.0 12.7 10.7 11.4 15.1 15.8 15.5 
Gearing 40 28 20 20 24 28 31 37 
Gearing Incl. Off 62 51 44 42 48 55 50 50 
Interest Cover 4.9 5.2 5.6 7.6 7.9 7.0 14.1 8.8 
Long-term Debt 95.3 82.7 93.0 83.8 81.3 70.7 81.0 84.7 
Revenue Seat Factor 78 .8 78.0 72.1 73.4 75.6 76.1 78.6 78.3 
Panel B: Air New Zealand 
Foreign Sales 78 .8 78 .6 78.0 79.1 80.5 88.8 77.7 76.8 
Fuel Cost n.a. n.a. 13.6 11.8 15.7 17.4 18.0 17.9 
Gearing 16 29 36 35 66 87 47 23 
Gearing Incl. Off n.a. 52 53 56 76 93 74 65 
Interest Cover 69.2 11.1 4.2 3.5 3.0 - 0.2 - 0.4 17.8 
Long-term Debt 72.8 82.9 86.1 87.7 68.5 76.0 91.0 89.3 
Revenue Seat Factor 67.7 68 .5 67.6 67.9 69.7 71.6 72.3 74.4 
*Source: Loudon (2004) 
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Appendix 8 Linear Risk Exposures by Loudon 
This table reports exposure coefficients for interest rate, currency and fuel price risk as 
estimated from the linear regression equation (1) for selected multi-week horizons. 
Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West robust standard errors. Rows labeled Wald 
2 
contain robust x statistics from the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the fuel, 
currency and interest rate coefficients in equation (1) are jointly zero. The last row 
gives the number of observations. 
Horizon in Weeks 1 2 4 13 52 156 
Panel A: Qantas 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.059 0.206** 0.258** 0.307 0.829*** 0.488* 
(0.100) (0.096) (0.121) (0.205) (0.260) (0.292) 
Currency Exposure 0.042 (0.001) 0.098 0.282 1.069* 0.428 
(0.170) (0.181) (0.266) (0.419) (0.639) (0.284) 
Fuel Price Exposure (0.057) (0.098)** (0.069) (0.037) (0.404)*** (0.333)*** 
(0.044) (0.041) (0.055) (0.092) (0.123) (0.084) 
Wald 2.181 12.134*** 7.207* 5.385 61.245*** 26.633*** 
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.123 0.125 0.191 0.534 0.679 
Panel B: Air New Zealand 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.111 0.172 0.254 0.03 -2.248** -2.951*** 
-0.172 -0.144 -0.155 -0.278 -0.946 -0.752 
Currency Exposure 0.211 0.739 1.371* 1.480** 0.997 -3.765*** 
-0.36 -0.653 -0.803 -0.735 -0.89 -0.294 
Fuel Price Exposure -0.132** -0.079 0.02 0.165 0.915* -0.093 
-0.063 -0.08 -0.115 -0.198 -0.488 -0.196 
Wald 8.404** 6.642* 6.447* 5.003 8.062** 461.78*** 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.171 0.201 0.16 0.35 0.783 
Observations 412 411 409 400 361 257 
Note:***,** and* Significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
*Source: Loudon (2004) 
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Appendix 9 Non-Linear Risk Exposures 
This table reports exposure coefficients for interest rate, currency and fuel price risk as 
estimated from the non-linear regression equation (2) for selected multi-week horizons. 
Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West robust standard errors. Neutral is exposure to 
risk factor innovations within plus or minus half the standard deviation of sample 
innovations. Positive/Negative refers to innovations outside this range. Rows labeled 
2 
Wald contain robust x statistics from the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the 
exposure coefficients related to neutral, positive and negative innovations of the 
relevant risk factor are jointly equal. The last row gives the number of observations. 
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Horizon in Weeks 1 2 4 13 52 156 
Panel A: Qantas 
Interest Rate Exposure 
Neutral -0.257 0.785* -0.437 0.634 1.057** 0.146 
-0.512 -0.427 -0.533 -0.723 -0.423 -0.344 
Positive 0.021 0.268* 0.588*** 0.785** 0.923*** 0.13 
-0.17 -0.157 -0.2 -0.343 -0.221 -0.084 
Negative 0.078 0.06 0.018 -0.011 0.776** 0.454 
-0.168 -0.157 -0.173 -0.245 -0.309 -0.279 
Wald 0.09 0.331 4.815** 1.073 0 0.344 
Currency Exposure 
Neutral -1.209 1.734** -0.111 0.19 2.218 -1.984*** 
-0.873 -0.861 -0.815 -1.198 -1.535 -0.559 
Positive 0.26 0.44 0.649* 0.055 -2.229** 2.244*** 
-0.326 -0.364 -0.384 -0.77 -0.987 -0.485 
Negative -0.066 -0.405 -0.421 0.289 2.245*** 0.738** 
-0.29 -0.26 -0.436 -0.543 -0.375 -0.312 
Wald 2.188 0.13 2.163 0.036 31.161*** 71.904*** 
Fuel Price Exposure 
Neutral -0.183 -0.330 -0.146 -0.349* -0.220 0.536*** 
-0.233 -0.242 -0.221 -0.188 -0.224 -0.18 
Positive 0.047 -0.018 -0.077 -0.007 -0.696*** -0.410*** 
-0.078 -0.066 -0.078 -0.106 -0.12 -0.13 
Negative -0.154** -0.138** -0.031 -0.047 0.159* 0.186* 
-0.07 -0.068 -0.093 -0.149 -0.083 -0.096 
Wald 2.438 2.357 0.005 1.603 13.462*** 113.52*** 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.136 0.14 0.202 0.669 0.755 
129 
" . .. ' . , i ' .. " ' ,• ' - ' •. ' ., " ' .. . ., 
Horizon in Weeks 1 2 4 13 52 156 
Panel B: Air New Zealand 
Interest Rate Exposure 
Neutral -0.370 0.498 0.557 1.011 -2.124 0.458 
-0.461 -0.636 -0.729 -1.178 -1.397 -0.378 
Positive 0.132 0.118 0.123 0.573 -0.028 -5.095*** 
-0.255 -0.232 -0.326 -0.481 -0.994 -0.447 
Negative 0.182 0.246 0.357 -0.474 -2.472*** -1.873*** 
-0.312 -0.225 -0.243 -0.403 -0.551 -0.278 
Wald 0.325 0.316 0.403 0.129 9.903*** 124.29*** 
Currency Exposure 
Neutral -0.644 0.022 2.139* 5.225* -9.494*** -3.789*** 
-1.02 -1.246 -1.287 -2.757 -1.985 -0.723 
Positive -0.302 -0.198 0.948* 3.088** 3.239** -1.518* 
-0.399 -0.57 -0.55 -1.411 -1.431 -0.786 
Negative 0.66 1.402 1.706 -0.619 -1.305** -4.199*** 
-0.619 -1.218 -1.57 -0.753 -0.587 -0.525 
Wald 0.241 0.874 0.463 0.457 35.496*** 5.704** 
Fuel Price Exposure 
Neutral -0.086 -0.014 0.217 -0.895*** 1.514* 0.493* 
-0.369 -0.376 -0.24 -0.324 -0.83 -0.285 
Positive -0.204** -0.158 -0.121 -0.026 0.03 -0.225 
-0.091 -0.114 -0.138 -0.157 -0.268 -0.153 
Negative -0.077 -0.029 0.118 0.36 1.513*** -0.280*** 
-0.096 -0.103 -0.164 -0.306 -0.457 -0.074 
Wald 0.275 0.284 2.905* 0.833 10.117*** 6.392** 
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.173 0.199 0.214 0.538 0.858 
Observation 412 411 409 400 361 257 
Note: ***,**and* Significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
*Source: Loudon (2004) 
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